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INTRODUCTION

HE ownership of copyrightable works produced by university

professors has become an issue of interest in the scholarly
world since the publication in 1983 of an influential article on the
subject.' The ownership issue has become of interest also to university administrators since the 1970s, when administrators began
to covet certain of these copyrightable works for their universities. 2 The broader topic of the commercialization of all the products of university research, patentable, copyrightable and other,
has become a subject of general interest and concern in the past
decade.3 The purposes of this Article are narrow: to address the
* Assistant Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. Copyright 1992
Laura G. Lape.
1. See Todd F. Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They "Works Made for Hire" Under
the 1976 Copyright Act?, 9J.C. & U.L. 485 (1983). Simon concludes that university professors do not own their copyrightable works under copyright law and
advises university professors to obtain a written agreement from the university
that guarantees ownership of the copyright to the professor. See also Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
590 (1987) (contending that removal of copyright ownership from creators will
reduce quality and quantity of created work); Leonard D. DuBoff, An Academic's
Copyright: Publish and Perish, 32J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 17 (1985) (arguing that workmade-for-hire doctrine as codified could undermine professors' incentive to create); J.H. Reichman, Computer ProgramsAs Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications
of Copyright Protectionfor Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639
(1989) (surveying problems in university policy regarding computer software).
2. For a further discussion of the interest of universities in ownership of
works produced by university professors, see infra notes 120-58 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 1, at 646-47; Wayne Biddle, A Patent on
Knowledge, HARPER'S, July 1981, at 22; Naomi Freundlich, Business Goes to College,
Bus. WK., June 16, 1989, at 50; Institutions and Scholars Face Ethical Dilemmas Over

(223)
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questions of who now owns the copyrightable works of professors, how universities currently attempt to control such ownership issues, and how these issues should be controlled.
Part II presents an analysis of work-made-for-hire 4 cases
under the Copyright Act of 1909 (the 1909 Act). 5 This analysis
differs from that of prior commentators by making clear the limited role of agreements that grant the employee ownership of the
copyright in employee-created works. Part III explores the existence of an exception for professors from the work-made-for-hire
doctrine prior to the Copyright Act of 1976 (the 1976 Act). 6 Part
IV corrects a mistaken view of the impact of the 1976 Act, which
is widely accepted, though unpopular with commentators and
courts. 7 Part V discusses whether university copyright policies
are effective to alter copyright ownership. Part VI analyzes and
critiques the copyright policies at seventy leading research universities in effect at some time between February of 1990 and February of 1991 inclusive. Part VII makes recommendations
concerning the structure within which copyright ownership issues
between the university and professors should be resolved.
II.

WORKS MADE FOR HIRE UNDER

1909 ACT

The judicially-created doctrine of works made for hire was
first codified in the Copyright Act of 1909.8 Prior to the 1909
revision of the Copyright Act, courts had applied work-made-forhire principles in some cases, but by no means uniformly, and
Pursuit of Research with Commercial Value, CHRON. HIGHER EDuC.,July 29, 1987, at
11; The Big Bucks of Biology, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 1982, at 69.
4. Throughout this Article the term "work made for hire" means work
made for hire within the terms of the federal Copyright Act or within the terms
of common law copyright. Unless indicated otherwise, the term "work made for
hire" does not herein connote work made for hire within the terms of an employment contract.
5. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 1-64, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version
codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988)).
6. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988)).
7. For a discussion of conflicting interpretations of the 1976 Act, see infra
notes 51-94 and accompanying text.
8. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087-88 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988)); see, e.g., Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d
1307, 1309 (5th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that 1909 Act was first federal statute to
give employers ownership of works made for hire). The previous major revision
of the Copyright Act, the Copyright Act of 1870, provided that the author, inventor, designer or proprietor had the sole liberty of printing, and otherwise
using the work, and contained no provision dealing with work made for hire. See
Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 201(a) (1988)).
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usually with relatively little comment.9 The work-made-for-hire
provision of the 1909 Act appears, based on the sparse legislative
history, to be a codification of prior case law.' 0 Representatives
of publishers' organizations at the Librarian's Conference on
Copyright in 1905"1 commented that although courts were holding employers to be the owners of copyright in works produced
by their employees, adoption of an express provision to that effect
was desirable. 12 Section 26 of the 1909 Act provided merely that
"the word 'author' shall include an employer in the case of works
made for hire."'13 As author, the employer was entitled to obtain
9. Some cases showed hostility to the doctrine of works made for hire. See,
e.g., Pierpont v. Fowle, 19 F. Cas. 652 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 11,152); Binns v.
Woodruff, 3 F. Cas. 421 (C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 1,424). The court in Pierpont
denied the existence of a judicially-created work-made-for-hire doctrine and
criticized an act of Parliament establishing such a rule as aiding "those kinds of
patrons, who fatten on the labors of genius." Pierpont, 19 F. Cas. at 660. In
Binns, the court construed the Copyright Act of April 29, 1802, to deny copyright to one whose employees had designed a print, since the employer had not
"represented the subject in some visible form" with his own hands. Binns, 3 F.
Cas. at 423-24; see also Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977, 980 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862)
(No. 1,691) ("[T]itle to literary property is in the author whose intellect has
given birth to the thoughts," not in the employer for whom the work was
written.).
In cases decided prior to the 1909 Act, in which work-made-for-hire principles were applied, courts dealt with the doctrine briefly, and did not usually expressly integrate the doctrine into the statute by stating that the employer fell
within a term in the statute, such as "author" or "proprietor." See, e.g., Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903) (Court's entire discussion of work-made-for-hire principles: "There was evidence warranting the
inference that the designs belonged to the plaintiffs, they having been produced
by persons employed and paid by the plaintiffs in their establishment to make
those very things."); Hanson v.Jaccard Jewelry Co., 32 F. 202, 203 (C.C.D. Mo.
1887) (finding copyright in pamphlet belonged to railroad company because
produced at its "instance and expense"); Schuberth v. Shaw, 21 F. Cas. 738, 738
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1879) (No. 12,482) (assuming that employer owned copyright,
rather than employee who composed work); cf Edward Thompson Co.v. American Law Book Co., 119 F. 217, 219-20 (N.Y.C.C. 1902) (stating employer was
within meaning of term "proprietor" in statute).
10. For a comprehensive source of the legislative history of the 1909 Act,
see E. FULTON BRYLAWSKI & A.B.E. GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909
(1976).
11. Two sessions of this conference were held, May 3 1-June 2, 1905, and
November 1-4, 1905, at the suggestion of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Patents for the purpose of discussing a general revision of the Copyright
Act. Letter of Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Congress (Apr. 10, 1905), reprinted
in BRYLAWSKI & GOLDMAN, supra note 10, at C vii.
12. Report of the Proceedings of the Librarian's Conference on Copyright,
reprinted in BRYLAWSKI & GOLDMAN, supra note 10, at C 100 (statement of Mr.
Furniss); D 65 (statement of Mr. Elson); E 153 (statement of Mr. Luckling); E
155 (statement of Mr. Ames).
13. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087-88.
COPYRIGHT ACT
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copyright under section 9.14 The 1909 Act did not define the
term "works made for hire." Further, the act did not address how
to vary the ownership result produced by the statute. The Copyright Office prepared two memoranda drafts with clauses that
would have made the work-made-for-hire provision expressly
subject to an agreement to the contrary.' 5 These clauses did not
appear in the bills considered by Congress prior to adoption of
the 1909 Act or in the 1909 Act itself.
In cases decided under the provision of the 1909 Act, courts
were given no guidance by the statute as to when a work was a
work made for hire.' 6 In cases in which existence of a work made
for hire was an issue, some courts defined a work made for hire as
a work produced by an employee for his employer in the "scope"
or "course" of his employment.' 7 In many cases courts decided
whether the work was for hire based on the facts of the employment relationship and the circumstances surrounding the crea14. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 201 (a) (1988)). "The author or proprietor of any work
made the subject of copyright by this title, or his executors, administrators, or
assigns, shall have copyright for such work under the conditions... specified in
this title ..
" Id.
15. Memorandum Draft of a Bill to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, reprintedin BRYLAWSKI & GOLDMAN, supra note 10, at D LIX,
E XXX.
16. Since the work-made-for-hire provisions of the 1976 Act apply prospectively, cases are still being decided under the 1909 Act. See Roth v. Pritikin, 710
F.2d 934, 937 (2d Cir.) (stating that 1976 Act does not govern agreements entered into before act's effective date, January 1, 1978), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961
(1983); May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1980) (stating work-made-for-hire provisions of 1976 Act do not apply retroactively); National Broadcasting Co. v. Sonneborn, 630 F. Supp. 524, 532-33
(D. Conn. 1985) (finding work-made-for-hire provisions of 1976 Act do not control works created beforeJanuary 1, 1978). Contra Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet
Management Sys., 591 F. Supp. 726, 737 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (finding work-madefor-hire provisions of 1976 Act govern materials created beforeJanuary 1, 1978
that were published and registered after that date).
17. See, e.g., Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir.
1969) (stating employee-created work within scope of employment as part of
employment duties is property of employer), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970);
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Vance, 442 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.D.C.
1977) (stating that "work created by an employee within the scope of employment is the property of the employer"); Kinelow Publishing Co. v. Photography
in Business, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 851, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (stating that article
prepared by employees in regular course of business belongs to employer); Fred
Fisher Music Co. v. Leo Feist, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (stating
that "work made for hire by an employee in the regular course of his employment" belongs to employer). In cases in which the existence of a work made for
hire was an issue, relatively few courts defined or referred to a work made for
hire as a work created by an employee within the scope or course of his
employment.
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tion of the work. The facts expressly considered by the courts
varied widely from case to case and included: (1) whether the
work was produced on the purported employer's time;
(2) whether the purported employer paid for materials, equipment, and other labor used in creating the work; (3) whether the
work was produced in the purported employer's place of business; (4) whether the purported employee received a salary;
(5) whether the purported employer had the right to supervise
the manner in which work was performed; (6) whether the purported employer did exercise such right to supervise; (7) whether
the contract referred to the purported employee as an "employee"; and (8) whether the purported employer instigated crea8
tion of the work.'
18. Compare Fred FisherMusic Co., 55 F. Supp. at 360 (considering fact that
employee agreed to write songs for employer who promised to pay regular
weekly salary) with Olympia Press v. Lancer Books, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 920, 924
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (considering facts that translator worked in cafes and at home,
proposed works for translation, submitted unsolicited translations, was paid in
lump sum; typing was done at translator's expense, while publisher did not control style and content). See also Universal Match, 417 F.2d at 500-01 (considering
employer's right and exercise of right to direct and supervise manner in which
work was performed; use of employer's funds, time and facilities; payment of
compensation; and assignment of work by employer); Tobani v. Carl Fischer,
Inc., 98 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1938) (considering facts that contract recognized
arranger as employee, employee received weekly salary, and employer specified
type of composition to be produced); National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189
F. 215, 216-17 (M.D. Pa. 1911) (considering facts that employer caused book to
be written, made large outlays in production of work, and supervised artists and
authors carefully); Schmid Bros. v. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik K.G., 589 F. Supp.
497, 503-04 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding work not made for hire because nun had
full artistic control, work done not on orders of convent, work done in free time,
and convent incurred only minimal expense); Vance, 442 F. Supp. at 386-87
(considering facts that work produced to comply with regulations, and government time, employees, equipment and materials used); Kinelow, 270 F. Supp. at
853 (considering facts that article produced at expense and under sponsorship
of employer); Von Tilzer v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 53 F. Supp. 191, 193-94
(S.D.N.Y. 1943) (considering fact that work done from nine to five in employer's
place of business for fixed salary).
Some courts neither defined works made for hire nor explicitly considered
the particular conditions of the relationship between the parties in order to determine whether the work was for hire, appearing to assume a relationship sufficient to create a work made for hire. See, e.g., Yale Univ. Press v. Row, Peterson
& Co., 40 F.2d 290, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (finding book copyrightable by employer of book's compilers). Not surprisingly, some of these cases dealt with the
works of independent contractors. See, e.g., May, 618 F.2d at 1368-69 (treating
independent contractors as employees under work-made-for-hire doctrine);
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt, 428 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir.
1970) (finding designer of pin, hired as independent contractor, had no claim to
copyright).
There developed independent of the work-made-for-hire cases two related
lines of cases, the commissioned-photography and commissioned-art-work
cases. See Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939), cert.
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Many cases decided after 1960 stated that the rule that the
copyright in a work made for hire vested in the employer could be
overcome by evidence of an agreement between employer and
employee giving the employee ownership of the copyright.' 9 The
denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1940); Avedon v. Exstein, 141 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). Courts in these cases held that a commissioned photograph or work of
art belonged to the commissioning party. Yardley, 108 F.2d at 30-31; Avedon, 141
F. Supp. at 279. These decisions did not purport to be, nor did they rely on,
work-made-for-hire cases. The court in Yardley, dealing with a commissioned
work of art, stated that there was only one case on point (Dielman v. White, 102
F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900)), and relied, by analogy, on the line of photography
cases which held that the copyright vests in the party that commissioned and
paid for the photographs. Yardley, 108 F.2d at 30-31. The court in Avedon, dealing with a commissioned photograph, relied on "a long line of photography
cases" and did not mention § 26 of the 1909 Act or work-made-for-hire cases.
Avedon, 141 F. Supp. at 279; see also Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole Distrib. Corp.,
280 F. 550 (2d Cir. 1922) (stating that copyright to photographs vests in party
that commissioned and paid for photographs).
Note that in cases in which the work-made-for-hire doctrine was applied to
commissioned works or to works which were possibly commissioned works, the
courts frequently considered only whether the work was produced at the "instance" and "expense" of the commissioning party. See, e.g., Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1966)
(finding work-made-for-hire doctrine applicable whenever work made at "instance and expense" of commissioning party); National Broadcasting Co., 630 F.
Supp. at 532 ("In the absence of evidence to the contrary, ownership of the
copyright would ... be presumed to lie with the 'person at whose instance and
expense the work [was] done.' " (quoting Brattleboro Publishing Co., 369 F.2d at
567)); Goldman-Morgen, Inc. v. Dan Brechner & Co., 411 F. Supp. 382, 391
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding work-made-for-hire doctrine applicable whenever work
produced at instance and expense of commissioning party); Irving J. Dorfman
Co. v. Borlan Indus., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 21, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (stating that
when independent contractor produces work at instance and expense of commissioning party, work-made-for-hire doctrine applies); Electronic Publishing
Co. v. Zalytron Tube Corp., 151 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 613, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(stating that, where employer engages independent contractor to produce copyrightable work, copyright vests in party at whose instance and expense work was
performed); Gustave v. Zuppiger, 540 P.2d 176, 178 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (finding common law copyright vests in party at whose instance and expense work
was performed).
19. See, e.g., May, 618 F.2d at 1369 (stating that § 26 "must be read as creating a presumption of copyright in the employer which may be rebutted only by a
preponderance of evidence of a contrary agreement as between the parties"
(quoting I MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 5.03[D] (1991))); Universal Match, 417 F.2d at 500 (stating that § 26 "creates a
rebuttable presumption of copyright in the employer, a presumption which can
be overcome by evidence of a contrary agreement between the parties"); Charron v. Meaux, 60 F.R.D. 619, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (stating that § 26 must be
read as creating rebuttable presumption that copyright vests in employer); Royalty Control Corp. v. Sanco, Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 641, 643 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
(stating that § 26 creates rebuttable presumption of copyright in employer).
These decisions, which held that § 26 creates a rebuttable presumption,
rather than an absolute rule, of ownership in the employer in the case of a work
made for hire, occurred at the same time as, and may have been caused by, the
proliferation of decisions explicitly applying the work-made-for-hire doctrine to
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existence of such an agreement was an issue only if a work made
for hire had been found. 20 If the work was not a work made for
hire, then section 26 did not apply and the creator of the work
was entitled to the copyright to the work as its author under section 9.21
the work of independent contractors. See, e.g., Brattleboro Publishing Co., 369 F.2d
at 568; Electronic Publishing Co., 151 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 616-17. Prior to the
1960s, courts did not apply the work-made-for-hire doctrine to the works of independent contractors. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST
SESS., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAWS 86 (Comm. Print 1961) ("The courts, however, have not
generally regarded commissioned works as 'made for hire.' ").
Under the commissioned-photograph and the commissioned-art-work
cases, if a photograph or painting was commissioned, the commissioning party
was entitled to the copyright unless the artist by the terms of the contract reserved the copyright to himself or herself. See, e.g., Yardley, 108 F.2d at 30-31
(stating that where city commissioned artist to paint mural for school, there is
rebuttable presumption that city owns copyright in mural); Avedon, 141 F. Supp.
at 279-80 (stating that party who hires photographer owns copyright in photograph unless photographer expressly reserves copyright); Dielman v. White, 102
F. 892, 894 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900) (stating that copyright in commissioned work of
art belongs to hiring party unless artist reserves copyright to himself). Starting
in the 1960s, the commissioned-photograph and the commissioned-art-work
lines of cases were subsumed into the work-made-for-hire doctrine. See Brattleboro Publishing Co., 369 F.2d at 568 (copyright for work of independent contractor vests in employer, relying on Yardley); Electronic Publishing Co., 151
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 616-17 (stating that Yardley decision is applicable to works of
independent contractor). The treatment of § 26 as a rebuttable presumption
arguably resulted from the injection of the commissioned-photograph and the
commissioned-art-work lines of cases into the work-made-for-hire line of cases.
A majority of the decisions stating that § 26 created a rebuttable presumption, rather than an absolute rule, of copyright ownership in the paying party
involved independent contractors. See, e.g., Samet & Wells, Inc. v. Shalom Toy
Co., 429 F. Supp. 895 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); IruingJ. Dorfman Co., 309 F. Supp. 21;
Boulez v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 584 (1984).
20. Royalty Control Corp., 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 643. "Thus, where an employment relationship is present, determination of ownership of a copyright requires a resolution of whether or not the employment relationship is such as to
invoke the 'works for hire' provision of Section 26 and its attendant presumption
of ownership in the employer." Id.
Courts stating that § 26 created a presumption decided, first, whether there
was an employment or commissioned relationship sufficient to establish a work
made for hire and, second, whether there was an agreement between the employer and employee that the employee own the copyright, thus rebutting the
presumption. Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307, 1310-11 (5th Cir. 1978)
(finding that author created work as employee and failed to overcome presumption of employer ownership because no facts suggested parties intended employee to have copyright); Frontino v. Avon Prods., Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
713, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding relationship between parties was commissioning party and independent contractor; independent contractor's evidence did
not rebut presumption of employer ownership); Boulez, 83 T.C. at 595-96 (finding conductor was independent contractor to whom work-made-for-hire doctrine applied; contract reserved no rights in recordings to independent
contractor).
21. See Van Cleef & Arpels, Inc. v. Schechter, 308 F. Supp. 674, 679
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The treatment of section 26 as creating a presumption,
rather than an absolute rule, of copyright ownership in the employer was frequently not of great importance in cases decided
under the 1909 Act. 2 2 Courts sometimes found works made for
hire and concluded that the employer was entitled to the copyright without any reference to a "presumption" or without raising
the possibility of a contrary agreement. 23 In a number of other
cases in which works made for hire were found, the courts addressed the possibility of a contrary agreement in cursory fashion,
simply stating that insufficient rebuttal evidence had been
presented.2 4 There are very few reported cases in which a court
found a contrary agreement, remanded for further consideration
of the existence of a contrary agreement, or denied summary
judgment on the grounds that there was an issue of fact as to the
25
existence of a contrary agreement.
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). Where no work made for hire is found, no presumption of
copyright ownership in the employer arises. Id. "The plaintiff has failed to
prove ... the relationship of employer and independent contractor existed between [plaintiff] and [designers] so as to entitle the plaintiff to the presumption
of copyright ownership." Id.
In some cases in which no work made for hire was found, the decision did
not state that § 26 creates a presumption, rather than an absolute rule, of copyright ownership in the employer. E.g., Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows,
Inc., 522 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976); Donaldson
Publishing Co. v. Bregman, Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1967);
Schmid Bros., 589 F. Supp. 497. This is not surprising since, if no work made for
hire is found, the rule that the employer holds the copyright does not apply, and
there is no need to ask whether the parties agreed to the contrary.
22. The truth of this statement is not necessary to my thesis that the 1976
Act did not abolish the exception for professors from work made for hire.
23. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 1941);
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Vance, 442 F. Supp. 383, 386-87
(D.D.C. 1977); R. Dakin & Co. v. Charles Offset Co., 441 F. Supp. 434, 438
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Fred Fisher Music Co. v. Leo Feist, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 359, 360
(S.D.N.Y. 1944).
24. Murray, 566 F.2d at 1311 (finding that creator alleged no facts suggesting parties intended creator to own copyright); Scherr v. Universal Match
Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding that sculptors' bare allegations
of agreement contrary to presumption did not create triable issue of fact), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970); Frontino, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 714 (finding creator's evidence not sufficient to rebut presumption in favor of employer);
Bertolino v. Italian Line, 414 F. Supp. 279, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding no
evidence of express or implied reservation of copyright by artist).
25. Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 809 F.2d 366, 377 (7th Cir. 1987)
(remanding for further findings as to existence of contrary agreement), aff'd,
907 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding creator failed to establish existence of
contrary agreement), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 965 (1991); May v. MorganelliHeumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363, 1364 (9th Cir. 1980) (reversing summary
judgment and remanding to determine whether parties contracted contrary to
presumption); Sargent v. American Greetings Corp., 588 F. Supp. 912, 922-24
(N.D. Ohio 1984) (denying motion for summary judgment after finding "ques-
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In those 1909 Act work-made-for-hire cases in which section
26 was stated to create a presumption rather than an absolute
rule, there was no uniformity in the types of evidence admissible
to prove the existence of a contrary agreement in favor of the
employee. 26 In a number of such cases, the courts did not indicate what types of evidence were admissible. 2 7 A few cases explicitly required an "express contractual provision," apparently
conceived of as a writing, in order to prove the existence of an
agreement that the employee own the copyright. 28 In a few cases,
the courts showed uncertainty as to whether an agreement that
the employee own the copyright had to be express or could be
implied.2 9 In a very few 1909 Act work-made-for-hire cases, all
tions of material fact... concerning the parties' intent with respect to the ownership of the copyright"); Charron v. Meaux, 60 F.R.D. 619, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(denying motion for summary judgment after finding questions of fact as to
existence of contrary agreement).
26. In commissioned-photograph and commissioned-art-work cases, courts
required evidence of an express agreement that the employee own the copyright. Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole Distrib. Corp., 280 F. 550, 552-53 (2d Cir.
1922); Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892, 894 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900); Avedon v. Exstein, 141 F. Supp. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). The court in Avedon agreed with
defendant-employer's contention that "evidence of custom and usage cannot be
offered to alter a general rule of law and ... there is a general rule of law that a
photographer, employed to take a picture for a client, retains no rights in the
picture after delivery except such as are expressly reserved." Avedon, 141 F.
Supp. at 279. "If in the transfer [of the photographs] there was any limitation
for the benefit of the [photographer], that limitation .. .must have been expressed and clearly imposed." Id.
27. E.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. Sonneborn, 630 F. Supp. 524, 524
(D. Conn. 1985) (finding existence of work made for hire and that employer held
copyright, ignoring fact that some employees' written contracts granted employer license); Charron, 60 F.R.D. at 625 (denying summary judgment in part
because written contract appeared to rebut presumption of copyright in employer); Kinelow Publishing Co. v. Photography in Business, Inc., 270 F. Supp.
851, 854-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (finding work made for hire and that employer held
copyright).
28. E.g., Goldman-Morgen, Inc. v. Dan Brechner & Co., 411 F. Supp. 382,
391 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding no express reservation of copyright and stating
that employer has copyright in absence of "expressed contractual reservation to
the contrary"); Electronic Publishing Co. v. Zalytron Tube Corp., 151 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) 613, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (stating that independent contractor made no
claim of any agreement expressly reserving copyright to it, and that hiring party
holds copyright "in the absence of an express contractual reservation of the
copyright"); Boulez v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 584, 595-96 (1984) (stating that
written contract did not reserve copyright to independent contractor and that
"express contractual provisions between the employee and the employer, reserving to the former the copyrightable interest" were required in order to overcome presumption of copyright in employer).
29. E.g., Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d
565, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1966) (requiring "express contractual reservation"; permitting "express or implicit" reservation of copyright); Sargent, 588 F. Supp. at 92022 (requiring "express contractual reservation"; finding extrinsic evidence of
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decided after the effective date of the 1976 Act, courts stated that
extrinsic evidence, including the conduct and course of performance of the contracting parties and the prevailing custom and usage in the industry, could be used to prove an agreement that an
independent contractor would own the copyright. 30
III.

WORKS OF PROFESSORS UNDER 1909 ACT

A professor's scholarly writings, textbooks, computer programs or other copyrightable works could be considered works
made for hire under the 1909 Act. Several commentators have so
suggested, as has the Seventh Circuit in dicta. 3 ' Professors generally receive regular salaries pursuant to employment contracts.
They write using university-supplied facilities, libraries, research
parties' intent admissible); Samet & Wells, Inc. v. Shalom Toy Co., 429 F. Supp.
895, 901-02 (requiring "express contractual reservation;" finding extrinsic evidence of parties' intent admissible); Bertolino v. Italian Line, 414 F. Supp. 279,
284 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding contrary agreement may be express or implied;
requiring "express contractual reservation").
30. Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 809 F.2d 366, 374-75 (7th Cir.
1987) (remanding for consideration of existence of agreement that independent
contractor own copyright by analysis of parties' conduct and course of performance), aff'd, 907 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 965 (1991); May
v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980) (denying summary judgment and remanding for district court to consider evidence
including "prevailing custom and usage"). The court in May acknowledged that
there was little authority for its holding. May, 618 F.2d at 1369 n.5. The court
relied on Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir.
1965). May, 618 F.2d at 1369. The court in Lin-Brook stated that an express
contractual reservation was required, but admitted a written assignment of the
copyright from the independent contractor to the employer as evidence of such
a reservation. Lin-Brook, 352 F.2d at 300. The court in May also relied on Yardley, 108 F.2d at 31, in which the court "suggested that extrinsic evidence is
permissible to rebut the presumption." May, 618 F.2d at 1369. The May court
concluded: "We think it proper, then, to consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether the parties intended to contract contrary to the presumption of
the 'works for hire' doctrine. Such evidence includes prevailing custom and usage." Id.
31. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (dealing
with work created by high school teachers, and applying Copyright Act of 1976).
"Although college and university teachers do academic writing as a part of their
employment responsibilities and use their employer's paper, copier, secretarial
staff, and (often) computer facilities in that writing, the universal assumption"
until the 1976 Act was that the teacher was entitled to the copyright. Id.; see also
DuBoff, supra note 1, at 30-32, 34; Patricia A. Hollander, An Introduction to Legal
and Ethical Issues Relating to Computers in Higher Education, 11 J.C. & U.L. 215, 230
(1984); Simon, supra note 1, at 502-05. But see Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 597.
"Although universities paid faculty salaries, required (and supported) research,
exercised some rudiments of control over the sorts of scholarship that counted
toward advancement, and made library and other facilities available for scholarly
pursuits, these activities did not usually prove that the university was the motivating force behind the work." Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 597.
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assistants, secretaries, computers and supplies. Publication in the
professor's field is usually expected by the university and is therefore a part of the professor's employment responsibilities; the
works produced might therefore be found to have been created at
the employer's insistence. Although the university neither controls when and where a professor writes nor directly controls style
and content, the power to make decisions regarding tenure, dismissal and salary may amount to indirect control over the content
of a professor's writings, since the university's evaluation of the
32
writings is an important part of such decisions.
In spite of the plausibility of finding that the works of professors are works made for hire under the 1909 Act, no court did so
find. Two cases, Williams v. Weisser 33 and Sherrill v. Grieves,34 considered the work-made-for-hire concept with respect to professors but did not find works made for hire, in large part due to
policy and custom. 3 5 Since neither court found a work made for
hire, the question whether there was an agreement that the employee own the copyright was not reached. 36 These two cases
comprise the scant case authority prior to the 1976 Act for the
existence of an exception from the work-made-for-hire doctrine
37
for professors.
Sherrill applied section 7 of the 1909 Act, which provided that
32. Cf Hays, 847 F.2d at 416 ("university does not supervise its faculty in
the preparation of academic books and articles"). For a more thorough discussion of whether the works of professors fall within the definition of works made
for hire, see Simon, supra note 1, at 502-05.
33. 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Ct. App. 1969).
34. 57 Wash. L. Rep. 286 (D.C. 1929).
35. I use the term "concept" advisedly since neither case involved the application of § 26 of the 1909 Act.
36. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 546; Sherrill, 57 Wash. L. Rep. at 290-91.
37. These two cases were cited by Professor Nimmer to support the proposition that a professor's works are beyond the work-made-for-hire provisions of
federal copyright law. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 19, § 5.03[B][l][b][i] &
n.94; see also William H. Carnahan, Copyright in Our Realm of Learning, 7 C. COUNS.
421, 436 (1972) ("[T]he right of academicians, whether employed by the Government or a private institution, to copyright and retain a propriatary [sic] interest in their works, including lecture notes and manuscripts, has been well
defined by the courts."). But see Manasa v. University of Miami, 320 So. 2d 467,
468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (finding grant proposal written by director of university program was work made for hire, distinguishing Williams), cert. denied, 336
So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1976). Case authority for the existence of the exception for
professors may have been sparse because universities and professors were convinced of its existence. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir.
1988) (noting that reason for lack of authority was that "virtually no one questioned that the academic author was entitled to copyright"). Another explanation for the paucity of litigation in this area is that universities have not been
interested in acquiring the types of copyrightable works produced by professors.
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a publication of the United States government, a concept analogous to a work made for hire, was not subject to copyright protection.3 8 Sherrill, while employed by the army to teach military
map-related skills at a post-graduate school for officers, prepared
a book on the same subjects, and permitted the army to print one
part of the book in pamphlet form.3 9 The Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia rejected the infringing defendants' contention that the portion so printed was a publication of the United
States government, based in part on the court's conclusion that
producing the work did not constitute part of Sherrill's employment duties, and therefore did not meet the definition of a government publication. 40 The court's decision, however, rested
also, perhaps primarily, on the absence of judicial precedent
holding that a professor's works belong to the university and on
the custom of military schools not to claim ownership of instructors' writings. 4 ' To the extent that the court refused to apply
work-made-for-hire principles to the professor's work, relying on
the lack of judicial precedent and military school custom, rather
than on finding that the definition of a work made for hire was not
38. It is an unstated premise of the court's reasoning in Sherrill that, in order to qualify as a publication of the United States government within the terms
of § 7 of the 1909 Act, a work must be produced by a government employee in
fulfillment of his employment duties. See Sherrill, 57 Wash. L. Rep. at 290; see also
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077.
The current version of § 7 of the 1909 Act appears in § 105 of the 1976 Act,
17 U.S.C. § 105 (1988). "Copyright protection under this title is not available
for any work of the United States Government ...... 17 U.S.C. § 105. The
legislative history of § 105 indicated that "[ailthough the wording of the definition of 'work of the United States Government' differs somewhat from that of
the definition of 'work made for hire,' the concepts are intended to be construed
in the same way." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5672. "A 'work of the United States Government' is
a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as
part of that person's official duties." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
39. Sherrill, 57 Wash. L. Rep. at 286, 289-90.
40. Id. at 290.
41. Id. at 290-91. With respect to judicial precedent, the court stated:
"The plaintiff at the time was employed to give instruction just as a professor in
an institution of learning is employed. The court does not know of any authority
holding that such a professor is obliged to reduce his lectures to writing or if he
does so that they become the property of the institution employing him." Id.
Sherrill dealt with a textbook on the subject matter taught by the professor, not
with notes for or a transcription of his lectures. Id. at 290.
With respect to custom, the court stated: "The fact is that officers do write
such books which are copyrighted and used in Government schools with the
approval of the military establishment ...." Id. But see William S. Rome, Scholarly Writings in the University Setting. Changes in the Works and on the Books, 35 CopyRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 41, 50-51 (1988) (interpreting Sherrill as holding that
faculty owns works created outside scope of employment).
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met, Sherrill supports the proposition that a professor's works are
excepted from the work-made-for-hire doctrine.
Williams more explicitly excepted the works of professors
from the work-made-for-hire doctrine. Williams, a professor of
anthropology at the University of California at Los Angeles
(UCLA), argued that the common law copyright in his lectures,
both the unpublished notes and the oral delivery, had been infringed by Weisser's publication of notes of the professor's lectures taken by Weisser's employee. 4 2 Weisser argued that the
university, rather than Williams, held the copyright to the lectures
on the ground that the lectures were works made for hire. 43 The
court noted that the university could not control Williams' manner of expressing his ideas, 4 4 and that Williams had no duty to
record notes for his lectures. 4 5 Although these findings would
support a holding that Williams' lectures did not meet the definition of a work made for hire, this was not explicitly held. Instead,
the court broadly rejected the application of the work-made-forhire doctrine to the lectures of professors. 46 The court gave three
bases for its decision. First, the court cited the undesirable consequences of finding that universities own the copyright to profes42. Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 553-54 (Ct. App. 1969). The
plaintiff had alleged infringement of a state common law copyright in his lectures, rather than federal statutory copyright infringement, because under the
1909 Act oral lectures were not protected and unpublished notes were not protected without registration. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 9, 11, 35 Stat.
1075, 1077-78 (codified by An Act ofJuly 30, 1947, ch. 391, §§ 10, 12, 61 Stat.
652, 656) (copyright obtained by publication with copyright notice or by registration). Prior to the 1976 Act, "common law copyright," i.e., state common law
or statutory copyright, protected unfixed and/or unpublished works. I NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 19, § 2.02 n.3. Williams was decided under common law
copyright established by state statute. See Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542; 1953 Cal.
Stat., ch. 1557, § 2 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(1) (West 1982 &
Supp. 1989)).
43. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 549. The court, relying on SheriU, stated that neither Sherrill nor
Williams was under a duty to make notes. Id.
46. Id. at 546-47. The court stated:
The many cases cited by defendant for the general rule [regarding
work made for hire] probably reach desirable results that are in accord
with common understanding in their respective areas, but a rule of law
developed in one context should not be blindly applied in another
where it violates the intention of the parties and creates undesirable
consequences. University lectures are sui generis. Absent compulsion by
statute or precedent, they should not be blindly thrown into the same
legal hopper with valve designs . .. [and] motion picture background
music ....

Id. (citations omitted).
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sors' lectures. 4 7 Second, the court relied on the precedent of
SherriU and other cases dealing with rights to lectures. 48 Third,
the court noted the university's lack of interest in holding the
copyright to such lectures. 4 9 The court did not say that professors' works satisfy the definition of works made for hire and that
in all instances there are agreements that the professor own the
copyright; the court said that, in this context, the work-made-forhire doctrine should not be applied at all.
Relying on the foregoing two cases, commentators asserted
that prior to the adoption of the 1976 Act the work-made-for-hire
provision of federal copyright law did not apply to the works of
50
professors.
IV.

IMPACT OF ADOPTION OF

1976

ACT

The Copyright Act of 1976, 5 1 a general revision of federal
copyright law, treats work made for hire in two sections, a defini53
tion of work made for hire in section 101,52 and section 201(b),

which is analogous to section 26 of the 1909 Act. Contrary to a
47. Id. at 546. "Indeed the undesirable consequences which would follow
from a holding that a university owns the copyright to the lectures of its professors are such as to compel a holding that it does not." Id. Professors move from
campus to campus developing their ideas as they go; which university would own
the lectures? Could a professor be enjoined from using the material at his next
post? See id.
48. See id. at 547-49. These lecture cases dealt with the question whether
there was any legal theory under which a lecturer could prevent the audience
from publishing his lectures, and whether lecturing was a divesting publication.
Id. In Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 47 Eng. Rep. 1313 (Ch. 1825), the court held
that a lecturer has a property right in his lectures. The court in Abernethy also
stated that there was no evidence that the lecturing surgeon did not have the
right to publish his lectures in spite of the "peculiar situation which he filled in
the hospital." 47 Eng. Rep. at 1318; see also Caird v. Sime, 12 App. Cas. 326, 360
(H.L. 1887) (holding that lecturing is not divesting publication); Nicols v. Pitman, 26 Ch. D. 374, 381 (1884) (finding implied contract that audience will not
publish lecture). With the exception of the ambiguous sentence in Abernethy concerning the surgeon's "peculiar situation" quoted above, these lecture cases had
only peripheral relevance to the work-made-for-hire doctrine. This relevance is
that the defendants did not raise the issue by arguing that the institutions employing the lecturers owned the copyright.
49. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 545 n.5. The court noted that UCLA made no
claim to Williams' lectures and had filed an amicus curiae brief in his favor. Id.
The court stated that no reason had been suggested why a university would want
to own a professor's lectures. Id. at 546.
50. For a discussion of the views of selected commentators, see supra note
37.
51. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988).
52. Id. § 101.
53. Id. § 201(b).
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commonly held belief,54 the language of the work-made-for-hire
provisions of the 1976 Act does not preclude the continued existence of an exception for professors. The 1976 Act incorporates a
definition of an employee's work made for hire which codifies language developed in cases decided under the 1909 Act: "a work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment." 5 5 The legislative history of the work-made-for-hire provisions of the 1976 Act shows continuity with the prior law by
stating that "[s]ection 201(b) of the bill adopts one of the basic
principles of the present law: that in the case of works made for
hire the employer is considered the author of the work...56
54. See Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 598-99 ("[s]cholars have indeed concluded
that the 1976 Act abolishes the teacher exception to the work for hire doctrine"); DuBoff, supra note 1, at 25, 33; Simon, supra note 1, at 507; see also Hays
v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[Ilt is widely believed
that the 1976 Act abolished the teacher exception."); Weinstein v. University of
Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987) (1976 Act "is general enough to
make every academic article a 'work made for hire' and therefore vest exclusive
control in universities rather than scholars").
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. For a discussion of work prepared within the scope
or course of employment, see supra note 17 and accompanying text. The Register of Copyright had rejected a suggestion to use this more specific language in
lieu of the term work made for hire in the new statute and suggested instead that
it be adopted as a definition of work made for hire. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG.,

IST SESS., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE

87 (Comm. Print 1961).
The 1976 Act did change the definition of works made for hire produced by
an independent contractor. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. Prior to the 1976 Act, courts
found works made for hire based simply on the fact that the works were commissioned. For a further discussion of commissioned works, see supra note 18 and
accompanying text. The 1976 Act defines a work made for hire as either:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned [which falls
within one of nine enumerated categories of works] if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall
be considered a work made for hire.
Id. § 101. The 1976 Act is more protective of independent contractors than was
the 1909 Act, as the latter act was applied; under the 1976 Act, a commissioned
work by an independent contractor can be a work made for hire only if it meets
the requirements of § 101(2). See Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737-38 (1989). Professors may well produce works within
the categories enumerated in § 101(2), such as translations, supplementary
works, instructional texts and contributions to a collective work. However, a
professor's work would be a commissioned work only where he had been specifically hired to produce a work aside from his regular employment duties. Thus,
the protection given by the 1976 Act to independent contractors is of limited
importance in determining the rights of professors to their works under the act.
56. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736-37; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1976).
The reports stated that Congress rejected a suggestion for a major change in the
nature of an employer's rights to works produced by its employees. It had been
proposed that the employer receive only a right to the works analogous to the
"shop right" doctrine of patent law. H.R. REP. No. 1746, supra, at 121, reprinted
GENERAL REVISION OF U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw
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The legislative history makes no mention of the exception for
professors. In determining whether the producer of a work was
an employee within the meaning of the work-made-for-hire definition in the 1976 Act, the Supreme Court has used the same sort
of agency law factors that had been used by many courts under
the 1909 Act. 5 7 Thus, with respect to employees, the definition of

a work made for hire was not changed by the 1976 Act. There is
nothing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history to suggest that
the common law exception for professors from the common law
definition of work made for hire was eradicated by the act.
The 1976 Act, however, did clarify and limit the types of evidence admissible, after a work made for hire has been found, to
prove an agreement that the employee owns the copyright. Section 201(b) provides: "In the case of a work made for hire, the
employer ... is considered the author for purposes of this title,
and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised
in the copyright." 5 8 The question of what types of evidence can
prove an agreement that the employee own the copyright only
comes into play if a work made for hire has been found. Therein 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5736-37; S. REP. No.473, supra, at 104-05. The Conference Report did not mention the work-made-for-hire provisions. H.R. REP. No.
1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5810.
57. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 740. For a further discussion of the agency law factors in cases decided under the 1909 Act, see supra
note 18 and accompanying text. Factors employed by the Court which had been
used in the 1909 Act work-made-for-hire cases were: the right of the purported
employer to control the manner of performance, use of the purported employer's tools and materials, work performed in the purported employer's place
of business, purported employer's control of work hours, and method of payment. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 740-41. The Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence understandably did not stress the 1976 Act's
continuity with the 1909 Act's definition of work made for hire in the case of
agency law employees since the Court was focusing on the new § 101 definition's change of prior law with respect to independent contractors. See id. The
Court overruled a line of cases which held that the work of an independent contractor was work made for hire under § 101(1) of the 1976 Act if the hiring party
had the right to control the final product or had exercised control over the creation of the work. Id. at 742.
Lower courts have found that, with respect to employees, the definition of
work made for hire remains unchanged by the 1976 Act. See, e.g., Mister B Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that "[t]he work for hire doctrine survives intact with respect to employer
and employees").
58. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988).
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fore, the precedential value of Sheri1159 and Williams 60 was not
modified by this revision. In neither case did the court get past
the initial determination whether there was a work made for hire;
both courts refused to find a professor's work made for hire. 61 A
common law exception to the definition of work made for hire is
undisturbed by section 201(b).
The extent to which the requirement of a written instrument
in section 201 (b) of the 1976 Act constitutes a major change from
section 26 of the 1909 Act may be exaggerated. Under section 26
courts often did not clarify what types of evidence of an agreement were admissible, there was no uniformity among the courts
that did address this issue, and there were few reported cases in
which a creator successfully defended a claim to a copyright on
the basis of such an agreement, either express or implied. 62 A
few courts, applying section 26, required an "express contractual
63
provision," thus apparently requiring a writing.
It should be noted that under neither the 1909 Act nor the
1976 Act can an agreement between employer and employee determine whether a work is a work made for hire within the terms
of the statute. 6 4 An agreement to assign his copyright is enforceable against an employee, but the rights of an employer who holds
a copyright as assignee differ from those of an employer who is a
65
section 201(b) author of a work made for hire.
59. For a discussion of Sherrill, see supra notes 34 & 38-41 and accompanying text.
60. For a discussion of Williams, see supra notes 33 & 42-49 and accompanying text.
61. For a further discussion of the holdings in Sherrill and Williams, see supra
notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
62. For a further discussion of what evidence was admissible under the
1909 Act, see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
63. For a further discussion of courts requiring an "express contractual
provision" under the 1909 Act, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
64. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 19, § 5.03[B][1][b][ii], [D]. Under the
1976 Act, an agreement that an employee's work is made for hire will not convert a work which does not fall within the definition of work made for hire into a
work made for hire. Id. Similarly, if a work is a work made for hire, the parties'
agreement that the work not be work made for hire does not change the status of
the work. Id.; see also Reichman, supra note 1, at 675 n.186. The employer and
employee could, of course, structure their relationship so that the employee's
work would fall within the definition of work made for hire.
65. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 19, § 5.03[B][l][b][i]. Under the 1976
Act, the author of any work other than a work made for hire can terminate a
transfer of copyright executed on or afterJanuary 1, 1978, during the five years
following the expiration of a period of 35 years after the execution of the transfer, with the result that all rights transferred revert to the author. 17 U.S.C.
§ 203 (1988); see also id. § 304(c) (similar provision for termination of transfers
of renewal copyrights made beforeJanuary 1, 1978). Thus, if an employer holds
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Two influential articles published in 1983 and 1985 concluded that the 1976 Act abolished the exception for professors
from the work-made-for-hire doctrine. 66 The arguments proposed by these commentators to support this proposition were:
1) the 1976 Act's purported strengthening of the presumption
that employers own the copyright of the works of their employees; 6 7 2) the preemption of common law copyright by section

and 3) the rejection by the 1976 Act of evidence of custom. 69 These arguments are logically flawed and therefore fail to
support the conclusion drawn from them.
301;68

the copyright as assignee, the employee author can terminate the grant. If the
employer holds the copyright as author of a work made for hire, the employee
cannot affect the employer's copyright. If an agreement could determine
whether a work is a work made for hire within the terms of the statute, assignees
could avoid the termination of transfer provision of § 203. 3 NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 19, § 11.02[A][2].
The person entitled to the renewal in a work which was in its first copyright
term onJanuary 1, 1978 varies according to whether the work is a work made for
hire. If it is a work made for hire, the proprietor may renew; otherwise, the

author may renew. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a).
The term of copyright in works created after January 1, 1978 differs depending on whether the work is a work made for hire. Id. § 302(a), (c).
66. DuBoff, supra note 1, at 24-25; Simon, supra note 1, at 507. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and commentators have cited
these two articles for the proposition that the 1976 Act abolished the professors'
exception or for the proposition that it is commonly believed that the act abolished the exception. See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416-17 (7th
Cir. 1988) (citing Simon article for proposition that "it is widely believed that
the 1976 Act abolished the teacher exception"); Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing DuBoff article for proposition
that § 201 (b) of 1976 Act "is general enough to make every academic article a
'work for hire' "); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 1 at 598-99 ("Scholars have indeed
concluded that the 1976 Act abolishes the teacher exception .... "); Rome, supra
note 41, at 53-54 ("If Williams was ever authority for excluding scholarly writing
from the work for hire rule, this conclusion is no longer viable."). Professor
Dreyfuss cites these articles with the proviso: "I summarize commentators' findings regarding the operation of the work for hire doctrine, conclusions that I
accept for argument's sake but do not personally endorse." Dreyfuss, supra note
1, at 593.
67. Simon, supra note 1, at 486. The purported strengthening of the presumption is argued to flow from the § 201 (b) requirement of a writing in order
for an employee to own the copyright in a work made for hire. Id. Professor
Simon notes that the typical faculty employment agreement is comprised of
many implicit agreements and understandings that do not satisfy § 201(b). Id.
Professor Simon's argument, however, ignores the fact that § 201(b) only applies if a work made for hire has been found.
68. Id. at 486, 507. Section 301(a) of the 1976 Act partially preempts common law copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988). Professor Simon argues that,
since Williams was decided under common law copyright, the case is no longer
valid precedent. Simon, supra note 1, at 507.
69. DuBoff, supra note 1, at 33. Professor DuBoff's argument appears to be
that since the 1976 Act no longer permits evidence of custom to prove the existence of an agreement giving the employee ownership of the copyright, evidence
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The "strengthening of the presumption" argument posits
that the writing requirement of section 201(b) of the 1976 Act
strengthens the presumption that the employer owns the copyright in a work made for hire. 70 The only way to rebut the presumption is by a written agreement that the employee own the
copyright. 7 ' However, the fact that the presumption, once established, may now be more difficult to rebut does not make it any
easier to establish the presumption.
Section 301 provides that all rights equivalent to those
granted by the Copyright Act in works fixed in tangible form are
governed exclusively by that act. 72 This section partially
preempts common law copyright, that is, state copyright, which
prior to the 1976 Act had protected unfixed works and unpublished works. 73 The argument based on section 301 is that the
1976 Act abolished the professors' exception because, since Williams was decided under common law copyright, section 301
"washes away the Williams rule." 74 This does not appear to be the

case. First, Sherrill, which offers some support for the proposition
that there is an exception for professors from the work-made-forof custom is no longer admissible to prove that a work is not a work made for
hire. Id.
It has been suggested that the gist of the articles by Professors Simon and
DuBoff is that the 1976 Act discourages courts from deciding whether a work is
a work made for hire by considering the presence of certain facts and circumstances in the employment relationship and in the creation of the work.
Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 598-99. For a further discussion of these facts and
circumstances, see supra note 18 and accompanying text. This was not the thrust
of the Simon and DuBoff articles. Furthermore, it does not appear to be an
accurate assessment of the impact of the 1976 Act. See Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at
599 n.37; see also Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
740-4 1 (1988) (courts should use principles of agency law to determine whether
there is work made for hire). Professor Reichman cited the Simon and DuBoff
articles for the proposition that some commentators believe that the 1976 Act
abolished the professors' exception, but Professor Reichman did not address the
changes between the 1976 Act and prior law which have been said to bring
about this result. See Reichman, supra note 1, at 673-74.
70. Simon, supra note 1, at 486, 501, 505-06.
71. Note that the presumption is established by finding that a work is a
work made for hire.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988). "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of
expression when its embodiment in a copy... is sufficiently permanent or stable
to permit it to be . . .reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration." Id. § 101.
73. 1 NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 19, § 2.02. Common law copyright was

either state common law copyright or state statutory copyright. Id.
74. Simon, supra note 1, at 507. Simon states that "Williams is no longer
precedent for exempting scholarly writings from the 1976 Act's works-for-hire
provisions." Id.
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hire doctrine, was decided under section 7 of the 1909 Act. 75 Judicial glosses on sections of the 1909 Act reenacted in the 1976
Act survived adoption of the 1976 Act unless precluded by that
act. 76 Thus, to the extent that Sherrill supported the existence of a
professors' exception from the work-made-for-hire provision of
the 1909 Act, Sherrill now supports the existence of an exception
to the 1976 Act. Second, section 301 expressly does not preempt
state protection of unfixed works. 77 Since Williams dealt with both
the professor's written notes and the oral expression of his lectures, the Williams decision could be made today under common
law copyright with respect to the latter. 78 Finally, even to the extent that Williams dealt with a written work, which state law could
no longer protect, this fact does not undercut the court's reasoning concerning the work-made-for-hire doctrine as applied to
professors.
The argument that the 1976 Act's rejection of evidence of
custom abolished the professors' exception appears to be as fol75. For a further discussion of the Sherrill decision, see supra notes 38-41
and accompanying text.
76. Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1758 (1990) ("[W]e must look to the
language of and case law interpreting § 24 [of the 1909 Act in order to interpret
§ 304 of the 1976 Act which reenacts § 24]."); see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra

note 19, § 10.03[A] ("It may be assumed that other judicial glosses upon the
1909 Act writing requirement will also be carried over to the current Act.").
Professor DuBoff appears to argue that the Sherrill and Williams exception
for professors was a "common law doctrine" and therefore was preempted by
§ 301. DuBoff, supra note 1, at 33 n.107. The exception for professors was a
judicial interpretation of or gloss on the terms "work made for hire" and "publication of the United States Government." The 1976 Act did not preempt all
judicial interpretation of or glosses on the 1909 Act. See, e.g., id. at 26-32 (citing
judicial interpretations of or glosses on the term work made for hire in cases
decided under the 1909 Act in order to interpret "work made for hire," "employee" and "scope of employment" under the 1976 Act).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(l) (1988); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 19,
§ 2.02. "[S]ection 301 (b) explicitly preserves common law copyright protection
for one important class of works: works that have not been 'fixed in any tangible
medium of expression.'" H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5747. "Unfixed" works, for example, are
"extemporaneous speech, 'original works of authorship' communicated through
conversations or live broadcasts ...." Id.
78. See Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 543 (Ct. App. 1969). Admittedly, the court appears to have viewed the written notes as more important than
the oral expression. Id. Professor Simon recognized this fact but discounted the
applicability of Williams as authority for cases dealing with any professorial works
other than oral lectures. Simon, supra note 1, at 507. Prior to the 1976 Act,
Williams, although involving only lectures, was considered authority for the
proposition that all copyrightable works by professors were exempt. 1 NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 19, § 5.03[B][l][b][i]; Carnahan, supra note 37, at 436.
Williams is not distinguishable from cases concerning other types of works since
the court's decision did not rest on characteristics unique to lectures.
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lows: 1) custom was admissible under the 1909 Act; 2) Williams
used custom to determine whether a work is a work made for hire;
and 3) under the 1976 Act, only a written agreement can "alter
the work-for-hire rules set forth in section 201." 79 In reality,
however, very few cases under the 1909 Act admitted evidence of
custom in order to prove the existence of an agreement that the
employee own the copyright. 80 More significantly, the existence
of such an agreement is relevant only after a work made for hire
has been found. 8' The court in Williams relied on custom, policy
and the lack ofjudicial precedent holding that the work-made-forhire doctrine applies to professors, to hold that the work-made82
If
for-hire doctrine should not be applied to professors at all.
no work made for hire is found, section 201 does not apply.
Therefore, if courts rely on the precedent of Sherrill and Williams,
which the 1976 Act does not prevent them from doing, the writing requirement of section 201 of the 1976 Act will not affect the
83
ability of a professor to claim copyright in his works.
Commentators and the Seventh Circuit have cited these two
articles for the proposition that the 1976 Act abolished the
84
professors' exception from the work-made-for-hire doctrine.
Although the Seventh Circuit does not approve of the consequences of abolishing the professors' exception, the court appears to have accepted the commentators' arguments leading to
this conclusion.8 5 In the Seventh Circuit's 1987 decision in Weinstein v. University of Illinois,86 the court indicated in dictum that it
79. DuBoff, supra note 1, at 33-34.
80. For a further discussion of the admission of extrinsic evidence under
the 1909 Act, see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
81. For a further discussion of the creation of the presumption of copyright
ownership in the employer, see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
82. For a further discussion of the Williams holding, see supra notes 42-49
and accompanying text.
83. For a further discussion of the writing requirement of § 201, see supra
notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
84. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[I]t is
widely believed that the 1976 Act abolished the teacher exception." (citing Simon, supra note 1, at 502-09)); Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091,
1094 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[The 1976 Act] is general enough to make every academic article a 'work for hire' and therefore vest exclusive control in universities
rather than scholars." (citing DuBoff, supra note 1, at 24-26)); Dreyfuss, supra
note 1, at 593, 598-99 (citing Simon and DuBoff for proposition that scholars
have concluded that 1976 Act abolished professors' exception, which conclusion
author accepts for argument's sake but does not endorse).
85. Hays, 847 F.2d at 416-17; Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094. The Seventh Circuit noted the "havoc that such a conclusion would wreak" on the long settled
traditions of universities and colleges. Hays, 847 F.2d at 416.
86. 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987). A professor of pharmacy administration
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believed the 1976 Act had abolished the professors' exception,8 7
but did not make clear whether it found the work in question, a
professor's scholarly article, to be a work made for hire. 8 8 The
court also failed to clarify the relationship between the workmade-for-hire provisions of the 1976 Act and the university copyright policy incorporated in the professor's contract. 89 In a 1988
decision, Hays v. Sony Corporationof America,90 the Seventh Circuit

accepted in dictum the commentators' arguments that the 1976
Act had abolished the professors' exception. The court stated:
"To a literalist of statutory interpretation, the conclusion that the
at the University of Illinois at Chicago, who co-authored an article concerning a
clinical clerkship funded by the university, sued his co-authors, the university
and others for, inter alia, violation of the due process clause by revising the article and listing his name last. Id. at 1092-93.
87. Id. at 1094. The court argued that "[t]he statute [§ 201(b) of the 1976
Act] is general enough to make every academic article a 'work for hire' and
therefore vest exclusive control in universities rather than scholars." Id. (citing
DuBoff, supra note 1, at 24-26). The statement of one commentator that "Weinstein sub silentio rejected the notion of a 'teacher exception' " is too strong. Russell VerSteeg, Copyright and the EducationalProcess: The Right of Teacher Inception, 75
Iowa L. Rev. 381, 402 (1990). The court's statement citing DuBoff merely indicated that it believed the exception had been abolished by the 1976 Act.
88. Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1093-94. The court did not apply the definition
of a work made for hire to the article. Id.
89. Id. Under § 201(b), if the article was a work made for hire, a written
agreement would be necessary in order for Weinstein to own the copyright. 17
U.S.C. § 201 (b) (1988). Weinstein's annual written contract, which expressly incorporated the university copyright policy, would qualify as such an agreement.
See Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 628 F. Supp. 862, 863 (N.D. Ill. 1986),
aff'd, 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987). However, the Seventh Circuit's decision
did not clarify whether this was the court's line of reasoning. If the article was
not a work made for hire, the policy (as a term of Weinstein's contract) could
operate as an assignment or a promise to assign the copyright to the university.
For a further discussion of the effect of the incorporation of a university copyright policy in an employment contract, see infra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
The Seventh Circuit in Weinstein argued that the university copyright policy
allocated the copyright in the article to the professor rather than to the university. Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094-95. The court concluded that even if the professor owned the copyright, he was not deprived of this property since his coauthors, as joint authors, were entitled to revise and publish the article. Id. at
1095.
90. 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988). Two of the three judges who decided
Hays-Judges Posner and Easterbrook-had decided Weinstein. Hays was an appeal of Rule 11 sanctions against an attorney representing high school teachers
who claimed copyright infringement with respect to a computer manual they had
prepared for their students. Id. at 413. The court found that even if the exception from the work-made-for-hire doctrine did not exist, there would still have
been a reasonable basis for the teachers' claim since it was unclear whether the
manual would fall within the definition of a work made for hire. Id. at 417.
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Act abolished the exception may seem inescapable." 9 1 The
court's brief summary of the argument fails to come to grips with
the salient points of the commentators' argument that the 1976
Act had this effect, but rather assumes the point to be proven,
that the exception no longer exists. 92 Searching for a "possible
textual handle" with which to save the exception, the court suggested an implausible construction of section 201(b).93 Swayed

by both the desirability of maintaining a professors' exception
and the absence of any indication that Congress intended to abolish the exception, the Hays court stated that, if forced to decide
whether the 1976 Act had abolished the exception, it might decide that the exception had survived. 9 4 However, the court expressly did not decide the issue.
91. Id. at 416 (citing Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 598-600; Simon, supra note 1,
at 502-09).
92. Id. at 416. The court explained that "[t]he argument would be that academic writing, being within the scope of academic employment, is work made
for hire, per se; so, in the absence of an express written and signed waiver of the
academic employer's rights, the copyright in such writing must belong to the
employer." Id. Academic work was just as much within the scope of employment under the 1909 Act, and courts refused to apply the doctrine at all. For a
further discussion of the treatment of professors' works under the 1909 Act, see
supra notes 31-50 and accompanying text. For the arguments made by commentators that the 1976 Act abolished the exception, see supra notes 66-83 and accompanying text.
93. Hays, 847 F.2d at 417. The court suggested that § 201(b) "appear[s] to
require not only that the work be a work for hire but that it have been prepared
for the employer-which the [teachers'] manual may or may not have been." Id.
Section 201(b) provides:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of
this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a
written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in
the copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988). Work which qualifies as a work made for hire under
either of the definitions in § 101, whether a commissioned work or "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment," will always
have been prepared "for" someone. See id. § 101. Further, the phrase "for
whom the work was prepared" in § 201(b) modifies "other person," not "employer." See id. § 201(b). The phrase "other person for whom the work was
prepared" is a periphrasis for "commissioning party"; such a term is necessary
since the term "employer" is not appropriate to all work-made-for-hire situations. Compare the bifurcated definition of work made for hire in § 101. See id.

§ 101.
94. Hays, 847 F.2d at 416-17. Professor Reichman has predicted that the
courts will preserve the academic's ownership of copyrights. Reichman, supra
note 1, at 675 n.187 (citing Hays, 847 F.2d 412; Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987)). Professor Reichman stated: "The courts
will probably ... preserve the academic's ownership of his or her general literary
and artistic output, even though the current provisions on works for hire give
rise to diverse and conflicting interpretations." Id.
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Based on the foregoing analysis, the 1976 Act did not disturb
the professors' exception from the work-made-for-hire doctrine;
to the extent that such an exception ever existed, it continues to
exist. However, the developing interest of universities in faculty
copyrights, expressed in the adoption of university copyright policies, 9 5 may have an impact on faculty ownership of copyrights in
several ways. 9 6 Most importantly, copyright policies may vary
copyright ownership as a matter of contract between the professor and the university.
V.

EFFECT OF UNIVERSITY COPYRIGHT POLICIES

Initial ownership of the copyright in a professor's work is determined by the provisions of the Copyright Act, rather than by
the terms of any contract, including an employment contract. 9 7 If
the professor's work is not a work made for hire, the copyright
vests in the professor as author, and can be transferred only by a
writing complying with section 204(a). 98 Section 204(a) requires
for all transfers other than those by operation of law "an instru95. For a discussion of the adoption of university copyright policies, see
infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
96. University acquisition of faculty copyrights could persuade courts that
the exception for professors from work made for hire is no longer in keeping
with university custom.
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (a), (b). "Copyright in a work protected under this
title vests initially in the author or authors of the work." Id. § 201(a). "In the
case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work
was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and ... owns all
of the rights comprised in the copyright." Id. § 201(b). See Reichman, supra
note 1, at 675 n.186.
The 1909 Act and common law copyright governed initial vesting of copyright in works created prior to January 1, 1978. See generally 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 19, § 5.01[B].
The statement in the text is not intended to deny that an employment contract could, by the way in which it structures the employment relationship, contribute to the conclusion that a work is or is not a work made for hire under the
act.
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) ("[c]opyright ...vests initially in the author"). A
"transfer of copyright ownership" is an assignment, exclusive license or any
other conveyance other than a nonexclusive license. Id. § 101. Section 204(a)
states the circumstances under which "a transfer of copyright ownership" is
valid. See id. § 204(a).
Section 204(a) governs the validity of transfers made on or after January 1,
1978. Id. Transfers of statutory copyright made prior to January 1, 1978 were
governed by § 28 of the 1909 Act, which required "an instrument in writing
signed by the proprietor of the copyright." Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320,
§ 42, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (codified by An Act ofJuly 30, 1947, ch. 391, § 28, 61
Stat. 652, 660).
The work-made-for-hire provisions of the Copyright Act do not limit which
works can be transferred by a writing complying with § 204(a). 17 U.S.C.
§ 204(a). Contra Reichman, supra note 1, at 679.
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ment of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer"
in writing and signed by the transferor. 9 9 Written university
copyright policies in which universities claim copyright ownership
of certain faculty works may qualify as instruments of conveyance.' 0 0 It appears that the fact that a professor's future works
are not in existence at the time that the professor signs his contract is not an impediment to the interpretation of these policies
as instruments of transfer.' 0 l The copyright policies may also be
treated as agreements by professors to transfer copyrights at a
future date, which agreements must be in writing under section
204(a).' 0 2 Alternatively, if the professor's work is a work made for
hire, the university owns the copyright under section 201 (b) "un99. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). The term "note or memorandum of the transfer"
appears to include a writing memorializing a prior oral transfer. Eden Toys, Inc.
v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 36 (2d Cir. 1982); Dan-Dee Imports, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 524 F. Supp. 615, 618 (E.D.N.Y.
1981).
100. Current university copyright policies claiming copyright ownership of
certain faculty works employ language such as the following. "[Tihe University
shall be deemed to own all rights, title and interest in materials .... " UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES MANUAL

15.5.1.2

(1989) (Copyright Policy, approved by Visitors, May 29, 1986). "The University
will claim Copyright ownership in those cases where ....
UNIVERSITY OF NEW
MEXICO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY 6 (approved by Regents, Mar. 13,
1989). "University faculty ... retain all rights in copyrightable materials they
create, except when ..
" UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, 4 HANDBOOK 49 (1984)
(Copyright Policy, dated Mar. 1969; revised Oct. 3, 1977 and Sept. 26, 1983).
If the professor's work is not a work made for hire, and the copyright policy
provides that the work belongs to the professor, the policy would not vary the
result produced by the Copyright Act.
101. See Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1193-94
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (decided under 1909 Act, transferee effectively assigned statutory copyright in 1951 prior to assignment to itself in 1955), aff'd, 546 F.2d 461
(2d Cir. 1976); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 19, § 10.03[A] (though work not
in existence at time of transfer, transfer effective to give equitable title in work
upon its creation). Cases decided under the 1909 Act in which the transferor
granted in writing the copyright in works not yet in existence, and the transferee
thereafter obtained statutory copyright by publication or registration, are not
persuasive authority for the statement in the text since it appears that the common law copyright in unpublished works could be transferred without a writing.
See, e.g., Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345, 1347, 1349 (N.D. Cal.
1987); see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 19, § 10.03[B][2], at 10-38 n.28
(although no cases expressly so hold, it appears assignment of common law
copyright was not within Statute of Frauds).
102. Mellencamp v. Riva Music, Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 1154, 1162 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (stating that contract to transfer copyright cannot be enforced without a
writing); Library Publications, Inc. v. Medical Economics Co., 548 F. Supp.
1231, 1232-34 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (finding oral agreement to give plaintiff right to
distribute work unenforceable because "[s]ection 204(a) of the Act requires such
agreements to be in writing"), aff'd, 714 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1983). Some courts
may not draw a clear distinction between a transfer of copyright and an agreement to transfer copyright. See, e.g., Library Publications, 548 F. Supp. at 1231-34.
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less the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them."' 0 3 Written university copyright
policies which state that the copyright in certain faculty works
shall belong to the professor-creator may qualify as such express
04
written agreements.1
However, the written university copyright policy is generally
not included verbatim in a writing signed by the professor and by
a representative of the university. 0 5 The question, then, is
whether a written university copyright policy, which may or may
not be expressly incorporated by reference into a writing signed
by the professor and the university, satisfies the section 204(a)
requirement of a writing signed by the professor, or the section
201(b) requirement of a writing signed by the professor and the
university.
If the copyright policy is expressly incorporated by reference
into a written employment contract signed by the professor and
the university, the policy appears to satisfy both the section
204(a) and the section 201 (b) writing requirements. The Seventh
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988). By the terms of§ 201(b), if a work is a
work made for hire, an agreement by the parties cannot change the employer's
status as author. Further, an agreement by the parties cannot change the status
of the work as a work made for hire. For a further discussion of the impact of an
agreement on the status of a work, see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
104. Contra Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 600. Professor Dreyfuss states that
"while many faculty handbooks announce policies favoring faculty retention of
copyright, handbooks are unlikely to be considered signed writings within the
meaning of the Act [i.e., within the meaning of § 201(b)]." Id. (without citation
or explanation). Although Weinstein did not clarify the court's line of reasoning,
the Seventh Circuit's analysis may have been that the article at issue was a work
made for hire, but that the university's copyright policy satisfied the requirement
of a written instrument in § 201(b). For a further discussion of the Weinstein
decision and the requirement of a writing under § 201 (b), see supra notes 86-89
and accompanying text.
Current university copyright policies which provide that the copyright in
certain faculty works shall be owned by the faculty use language such as the
following. "Inventors/Authors will own inventions/materials which are ......
MASSACHUSETTS

INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, GUIDE TO THE OWNERSHIP, DISTRIBUTION AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF M.I.T. TECHNOLOGY 3 (Patent and

Copyright Policy Statement, dated May 24, 1989). "Except for writings that...
all rights to copyrightable material shall be reserved by the author ....
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY FACULTY MANUAL 60 (1989-90) (Copyrights, no date). "Except .... textbooks and other products of teaching, research, scholarship, and
artistic endeavors belong to the faculty or staff member .... " UNIVERSITY OF
IOWA, UNIVERSITY OPERATIONS MANUAL 30.16 (Policy on Intellectual Property,
approved by Regents, Mar. 1983).
105. See generally Beverly T. Watkins, Even Seemingly Innocuous Faculty Manuals Are Frequently Ruled to Be Legally Binding, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 2, 1985,
at 27-28 ("faculty manual has been adopted in higher education as 'a substitute
for an employee contract' ").
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Circuit indicated in Weinstein v. University of Illinois 106 that the written university copyright policy, which was expressly incorporated
into the professor's written contract,10 7 was effective to vary copyright ownership. 0 8 In the context of other university policies,
such as tenure, retirement, and dismissal policies, courts have
found the policies, where expressly incorporated by reference
into a written employment contract, binding on both faculty and
universities. 0 9 Such cases are, however, less persuasive in the
context of copyright policies because such aspects of annual employment contracts are not subject to state statutes of frauds. 10
If, on the other hand, the copyright policy is not expressly
incorporated by reference into a written employment contract,
the policy appears to satisfy neither the section 204(a) nor the
section 201 (b) writing requirements. The purpose of the section
204(a) requirement of a writing is to provide evidence of grants in
order to protect copyright owners from false claims of transfer."'
In other words, the section's purpose is to insure that a grant by
106. 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987).
107. Id. at 1094; Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 628 F. Supp. 862, 863
(N.D. Ill. 1986), afd, 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987).
108. Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094. The court did not clarify the interaction of
the policy and the Copyright Act. Id. The court may have thought that the university policy could redefine work made for hire within the meaning of the Copyright Act. Id. (noting that university adopted "a policy defining 'work for hire'
for purposes of its employees"). The district court in Weinstein decided the question of copyright ownership by construing the university copyright policy without reference to the work-made-for-hire and transfer provisions of the
Copyright Act. Weinstein, 628 F. Supp. at 865.
109. See, e.g., Sacchini v. Dickinson State College, 338 N.W.2d 81, 82-85
(N.D. 1983) (tenure policy incorporated by reference in professor's contract enforced against professor); Brady v. Board of Trustees, 242 N.W.2d 616, 618-19
(Neb. 1976) (enforcing dismissal policy incorporated in professor's contract
against university).
110. With respect to the cases cited in note 109, for example, see N.D.
CENT. CODE

§ 9-06-04 (1987);

NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 36-202 (1988).

Gordy Co. v. MaryJane Girls, Inc., 1989-1990 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH)
26,515 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), which was decided outside the university context, offers
some support for the proposition that a writing providing for transfer of copyright ownership, which is expressly incorporated in a written contract signed by
the copyright owner, does not satisfy the § 204(a) writing requirement. The
Gordy Co. court did not say that the writing expressly incorporated into the
signed contract did not satisfy § 204(a), but relied on estoppel to find that the
transferee owned the copyright. Id. 23,092-93.
111. See Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating that § 204(a) prevents inadvertent transfers), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1003
(1991); Eden Toys v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 36 (2d Cir.
1982) (explaining purpose of § 204(a) is to protect copyright holders from mistaken or fraudulent claims of oral licenses); Mellencamp v. Riva Music Ltd., 698
F. Supp. 1154, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Library Publications v. Medical Economics
Co., 548 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (explaining purpose of§ 204(a) is
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the copyright owner has in fact been made. A copyright policy
which is not expressly incorporated by reference into a writing
signed by the professor fails to provide any evidence that a grant
has been made. The writing requirement of section 201 (b) serves
a similar purpose' 12 but, unlike section 204(a), it requires an express agreement signed by both the employer and the employee.'' 3 The legislative history of section 201(b) does not
explain why the employee's signature is required in order for the
employee to own the copyright in a work made for hire." 4 The
requirement in section 201(b) of an agreement entered into by
both parties appears to be the result of those 1909 Act cases
which stated that, in the case of a work made for hire, the rule that
the employer was entitled to the copyright could be overcome by
evidence of an agreement between employer and employee that
the employee own the copyright." 5 Given that section 201 (b) requires an express agreement evidenced by a writing signed by
both parties, the signature of a representative of the university
affixed to the copyright policy at its adoption would not seem to
bind even the university because it is not signed by both parties.
With respect to such university policies as tenure and retirement,
courts are in less agreement that the policies are terms of the employment contract when the policies are not expressly incorporated by reference into a written contract than when they are so
incorporated." 6
"to insure the integrity of copyright interests, once granted"), aff'd, 714 F.2d
123 (3d Cir. 1983).
112. Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d
663, 672 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988). In the case of a work made for hire, the
employer owns the copyright "unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them." Id.
114. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736. "The subsection also requires that any agreement
under which the employee is to own rights be in writing and signed by the parties." Id.
115. For a further discussion of the presumption of employer ownership of
copyrights, see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
116. Compare Hillis v. Meister, 483 P.2d 1314, 1315, 1317 (N.M. Ct. App.
1971) (finding reappointment policy not expressly incorporated into written
contract was term of employment contract) and Rehor v. Case Western Reserve
Univ., 331 N.E.2d 416, 419-20 (Ohio) (finding retirement policy not set forth in
full and not expressly incorporated by reference was term of employment contract binding professor), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) with Drans v. Providence College, 383 A.2d 1033, 1037-38 (R.I. 1978) (finding professor did not
agree to retirement policy not expressly incorporated by reference into renewal
employment contract). The Drans court stated that "a person is not bound by
the terms of a written agreement if he had no knowledge of its terms because the
manner in which they are embodied in the instrument would not lead a reason-
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251

ANALYSIS OF UNIVERSITY COPYRIGHT POLICIES

Universities have long claimed ownership of the patentable
inventions of faculty members, but traditionally have not claimed
their copyrightable works."1 7 Universities began adopting written
policies claiming professors' patentable inventions early in this
century." 8 Most colleges and universities currently have written
policies concerning the ownership of the patentable inventions of
faculty.1 9 In the early 1970s, significant numbers of universities
began to adopt written policies governing the ownership of copyrights in works created by faculty members. 120 However, it still
able person to suspect that the terms are part of the contract." Drans, 383 A.2d
at 1037-38.
117. See, e.g.,
THOMAS E. BLACKWELL, COLLEGE LAW: A GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS 187 (1961); Hollander, supra note 31, at 222. Of 83 written policies
compiled by the National Academy of Sciences in a 1955 survey, only five mentioned copyrights, and these claimed either no works or extremely limited categories of works. See ARCHIE M. PALMER, SUPPLEMENT TO UNIVERSITY PATENT
POLICIES AND PRACTICES 45-93 (1955); ARCHIE M. PALMER, UNIVERSITY PATENT
POLICIES AND PRACTICES 27-229 (1952); see also Charles Weiner, Universities,

Professors and Patents: A Continuing Controversy, 89 TECH. REV. 32 (1986) (history of
university ownership of patents). In 1934, 18 universities were developing patents; by 1947, 200 universities were doing so. Id. at 39.
118. The first written patent policy was adopted by Lehigh University in
1924. Lehigh required faculty members to assign certain patents to the university. ARCHIE M. PALMER, SUPPLEMENT TO UNIVERSITY PATENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES 18 (1955); ARCHIE M. PALMER, SURVEY OF UNIVERSITY PATENT POLICIES,
PRELIMINARY REPORT 146 (1948). Of 800 universities studied by the National
Academy of Sciences in 1955, only 83 had written patent policies adopted by the
board of trustees, state legislature, or other governing body. Of those, approximately 70 universities claimed ownership of certain faculty patents. ARCHIE M.
PALMER, SUPPLEMENT TO UNIVERSITY PATENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES 9, 18, 4593 (1955); ARCHIE M. PALMER, UNIVERSITY PATENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES 27-

229 (1952).

A 1977 survey of 48 "major research" universities found that 47

had adopted written patent policies, of which 38 claimed ownership of certain
faculty patents. NATIONAL ASS'N OF COLLEGE AND UNIV. BUSINESS OFFICERS,
SURVEY OF INSTITUTIONAL PATENT POLICIES AND PATENT ADMINISTRATION 2

(1978).
119. See Phyllis S. Lachs, University Patent Policy, 10J.C. & U.L. 263, 263 n.l
(1983-1984) (stating trend since early 1960s is development of institutional policy and assertion of rights); NATIONAL ASS'N OF COLLEGE AND UNIV. BUSINESS
OFFICERS, SURVEY OF INSTITUTIONAL PATENT POLICIES AND PATENT ADMINISTRATION 1 (1978) (stating survey results showing 47 of 48 universities had adopted
written patent ownership policy were representative of "general community of
research universities"); see also Victoria McNamara, UH Files Lawsuit in Health

Value Dispute, Hous. Bus. J., May 14, 1990, § 1, at

1 (reporting University of

Houston suit to enforce patent policy against professor);Julie A. Traxler, Lovers,

Lawyers, Upstart Firms-Just About Everybody Loves Retin-A, Bus. FOR CENT. N.J.,
Aug. 20, 1990, § 1, at 3 (reporting University of Pennsylvania suit to enforce
patent policy against professor).
120. For example, Cornell University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of California adopted their first written copyright ownership policies in 1971, 1974 (effective date) and 1975 respectively. NATIONAL
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appears to be the case today that most colleges and universities
12 1
have no such written policy.
In order to more accurately assess the impact of written university policies on questions of copyright ownership between
faculty and universities, I collected the written copyright ownership policies, if any, of seventy leading research universities classified as "Research Universities I" by the Carnegie Foundation for
the Advancement of Teaching. 2 2 Of these seventy universities,
eleven currently have adopted no written policy governing ownership of copyright in faculty works and an additional five have
such policies in draft form only. 12 3 Given that major research
ASS'N OF COLLEGE AND UNIV. BUSINESS OFFICERS, PATENT AND COPYRIGHT POLICIES AT SELECTED UNIVERSITIES (1978).
121. NATIONAL ASS'N OF COLLEGE AND UNIV. BUSINESS OFFICERS, COPY-

RIGHTS AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

5 (1980) ("Many institutions have well-

defined patent policies and procedures, but few have adequate formal policies
governing copyrights."); Ivars Peterson, Bits of Ownership, 128 Sci. NEWS 188,
188 (1985) (noting that most universities do not have comprehensive copyright
policy).
122. The 70 universities classified as "Research Universities I" were selected by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching based on
their range of baccalaureate programs, commitment to graduate education and
research, and level of federal support. Leading Research Universities, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 6, 1989 (Almanac), at 24. The 70 universities are listed in
Appendix A of this Article. I solicited the policies of the above universities by
letters directed to university counsel at the respective schools from February of
1990 through February of 1991. I received responses from all 70 universities.
All discussion in this Article relates to policies current at the respective universities at some time between February of 1990 and February of 1991 inclusive.
For additional discussion of the policies of New York University, Pennsylvania State University, California Institute of Technology, Stanford University
and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, see Rome, supra note 41, at 61-67.
123. Of the 11 universities that have not adopted a written copyright ownership policy as of the date of this study, four indicated that adoption of such a
policy is not contemplated. See Letter from Ralph McCaughan, Office of the
University Counsel, Duke University (Feb. 8, 1990); Letter from Albert J. Velasquez, Office of the University Counsel, Indiana University at Bloomington (May
29, 1990); Letter from Caroline Kerl, Legal Advisor, Oregon State University
(Feb. 15, 1990); Telephone conversation with Toby Stone, Yeshiva University
(Feb. 8, 1991). All correspondence cited throughout this Article was directed to
the author.
Of the remaining 54 universities that have adopted written copyright ownership policies, one, Columbia University, states in its faculty handbook, to
which the written copyright policy is made expressly subject, that the policy is
not complete. The policy with respect to "designs, both architectural and theoretical, computer programs, and technical writings" is in the process of being

developed.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY FACULTY HANDBOOK

113 (1987);

COLUMBIA

UNIVERSITY, STATEMENT OF POLICY ON PROPRIETARY RIGHTS IN THE INTELLECTUAL

PRODUCTS OF FACULTY ACTIVITY 14 (adopted by Trustees,June 5, 1989) [hereinafter COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, STATEMENT OF POLICY]. The University of Michigan

has a "Regents' Bylaw" which addresses the ownership of patents and copyrights; a more detailed policy is not planned. Letter from John D. Ketelhut,
Deputy General Counsel, University of Michigan (Feb. 20, 1990).
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universities may be expected to adopt copyright ownership policies before smaller universities and colleges, these figures would
indicate that a smaller proportion of the latter have adopted such
policies to date.
Why have universities begun to adopt copyright ownership
policies and why have they done so now? Those current copyright ownership policies collected for this study for which the
adoption date (or effective date) is available were adopted between 1967 and 1990 inclusive.' 24 At least one court has suggested that universities have adopted copyright ownership
policies in response to the passage of the 1976 Act. 12 5 The adoption of many such policies prior to 1976, however, tends to refute
this assumption. Further, none of the policies collected in this
study fails to claim at least some faculty works, 126 which suggests
that the purpose of adoption was not to maintain the pre-1976
Act status quo, but rather to claim ownership of certain works for
the university. Of the policies studied, eight offer express explaOf the five draft policies, that of Northwestern University does not purport
to be binding with respect to works claimed by the university, but merely to
constitute the university's plan for future negotiations with faculty. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, COPYRIGHT POLICY DRAFT

1 (approved by Intellectual Property

Committee, Mar. 28, 1989).
124. The adoption (or effective) dates of these current policies are as follows: University of Miami, 1967; New York University, 1972; Michigan State
University, 1973; Case Western Reserve University, 1974; University of California (six schools), 1975; Harvard University, 1976 (first copyright policy adopted
in 1975); University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1977; University of Maryland at
College Park, 1979; University of Georgia, 1982; Pennsylvania State University,
1982; University of Iowa, 1983; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
1983; North Carolina State University, 1983; Rockefeller University, 1984; University of Tennessee at Knoxville, 1984; Carnegie Mellon University, 1985; University of Cincinnati, 1986; University of Illinois at Chicago, 1986; New Mexico
State University, 1986; University of Virginia, 1986; University of Kentucky,
1988 (1988 is effective date; first copyright policy adopted in 1974); University
of Chicago, 1989; Columbia University, 1989; University of New Mexico, 1989;
University of Pittsburgh, 1990 (effective date); University of Rochester, 1990 (effective date); Yale University, 1990. Note that some of these policies may have
been revised since the adoption or effective date.
125. Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987)
("The University of Illinois, like many other academic institutions, responded to
the 1978 [sic] revision of the copyright laws by adopting a policy defining 'work
for hire' for purposes of its employees, including its professors.").
126. A possible exception is the University of Connecticut, whose patent
policy is contained in state statutes and provides in relevant part, "The provisions of [the patent policy] shall not entitle the university ... to claim any literary, artistic, musical or other product of authorship [protected by copyright]."
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ l0a-ll0g (1988). This provision does not constitute a
copyright policy; if given works are works made for hire under the Copyright Act
and therefore belong to the university, this statement would not vary that ownership result.
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nations for the timing of the adoption of the policy.I27 The adand an increased interest in
vent of new technology
commercialization of faculty works are the primary reasons

presented.1 28 Only one policy cites the adoption of the 1976 Act
as a motivating force; this policy goes on to state that the policy
was also motivated by ownership issues raised by the increased
use of university resources in creating technologically complex
works. 129 Of the policies collected, nineteen distinguish computer programs from other copyrightable works,'

30

permitting an

127. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, STATEMENT OF POLICY, supra note 123, at 2;
GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, FACULTY HANDBOOK 6:16 (no date) (Copyright Policy, dated Jan. 1981); HARVARD UNIVERSITY, STATEMENT OF POLICY IN
REGARD TO INVENTIONS, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 1 (adopted by President and
Fellows, Nov. 3, 1976, amended Mar. 17, 1986); UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES POLICY AND PROCEDURES 1 (effective Jan. 12, 1988);
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COPYRIGHT POLICY 2 (approved by Regents, June 15,
1979); MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, FACULTY HANDBOOK 149 (1985) (Develop-

ment of Instructional Materials, approved by Trustees, Nov. 16, 1973; revised
July 28, 1983); UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, STATEMENT OF POLICY ON PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, AND LICENSING (Foreward) (adopted by Trustees, Oct. 19, 1984);

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, COPYRIGHT POLICY: OWNERSHIP 2 (dated July 26, 1983).
128. E.g., HARVARD UNIVERSITY, supra note 127, at 1 (growing use of technology raises new problems relating to ownership); UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY,
supra note 127, at 1 (recent developments have broadened scope of commer-

cially valuable information and technology, which should be treated as university
assets); MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note 127, at 149 ("new technology"

requires expensive resources provided by university, thus raising issue of ownership). Letters from two university counsel stated that policies were under consideration or adopted in response to the issue of ownership of computer
programs. Letters from William H. Griesar, General Counsel, The Rockefeller
University (Feb. 13, 1990). The other university counsel requested anonymity
for his university. For a further discussion of works claimed by genre (computer
programs and works requiring advanced technology), see infra notes 148-51 and
accompanying text.
129. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, supra note 127, at 1-3 ("Works in other than

simple written form as well as simple written works are more often a specific job
task and more often involve release time, special funding, computer use, special
equipment and the like.").
130. CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, FACULTY HANDBOOK ch. 7, at 6
(no date) (Royalties and Copyrights, revised May 1984); CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY 6 (dated July 30, 1985; effective Aug.
27, 1985); CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY, FACULTY HANDBOOK 28-34
(1988) (University Policies on Research and Scholarship, approved by Trustees,
Aug. 5, 1974); COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY, FACULTY MANUALJ-6 (1989-1990)

(Scholarly and Creative Activities of the Faculty, no date); COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, STATEMENT OF POLICY, supra note 123, at 3; UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, GENERAL RULES CONCERNING UNIVERSITY ORGANIZATION AND

PROCEDURE 30-31 (Copyrights, no date); UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO,
POLICY ON PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 11-12 (approved by Trustees, May 8, 1986);
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, UNIVERSITY OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 104, at 30.16;
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY, COPYRIGHT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 9 (no date);
MASSACHUSETrS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 104, at 12; UNIVERSITY OF
MICHIGAN, BYLAWS OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS (Ownership of Patents, Copy-
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inference that their treatment was a matter of concern to the
universities.
The impact of copyright policies on issues of copyright ownership has been discussed above. 1 3 ' The existence of a writing
rights, Computer Software, and Other Property Rights, dated Dec. 1985); UNIVERSITY

OF

NORTH

CAROLINA

AT

CHAPEL

HILL,

PATENT

AND

COPYRIGHT

PROCEDURES (adopted by Trustees, Aug. 19, 1983); OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY,
POLICY ON PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 1 (revised May 1989); UNIVERSITY OF PIrrSBURGH, POLICY: 11-02-02, at 2 (Copyrights, effectiveJune 29, 1990); UNIVERSITY
OF ROCHESTER, POLICY ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER

I (effective June 1, 1990); ROCKEFELLER UNIVERSITY, COPYRIGHT POLICY 1 (approved by Trustees, Jan. 18, 1984); UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, RULES AND REGULATIONS, ch. V, § 2.4 (Basic Intellectual Property Policy, amended through Dec. 7,
1989); TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY, ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY AND REPORTING MANUAL ch. 104, at 2 (no date) (Copyrights, dated Apr. 22, 1985). I have not
cited by
name the policy of one university, which requested anonymity.
Policies that include computer programs in a laundry list of types of works
are not included in the above tally. In addition, policies for computer programs
separate from the copyright policy are not included in the above tally. Of the
universities considered in this study, at least the following five have a separate
policy dealing with the ownership of computer programs: UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI,
UNIVERSITY SOFTWARE, PATENT AND COPYRIGHT POLICY

(amended Feb. 6, 1989);

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, FACULTY HANDBOOK 124-C (1989) (Statement of Policy

on Computer Software Copyrights, approved by Trustees, Jan. 24, 1972);
NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY, GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES FOR
DETER-

MINING OWNERSHIP OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE (approved by Trustees, Apr. 11,
1987); UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, ALMANAC 38 (Apr. 15, 1986) (Policy on
Computer Software, approved Mar. 19, 1986); UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSINMADISON, GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY PAPER 10 (Computer Software Own-

ership, revised Oct. 21, 1985).
Some universities treat the ownership of computer programs in their patent
policies, even if such programs are protected by copyright rather than by patent.
See UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, PATENT & TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICY 1 (en-

acted by Regents, Oct. 10, 1986);

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, COPYRIGHT POLICY

13

(dated May 1, 1982) (computer programs shall be governed by patent policy
because they are "closer to inventions"). Some universities have attempted to
split the treatment of computer programs between their patent and copyright
policies, thus compounding the interpretation problems inherent in such policies. See CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY, supra, at 28-34 (computer programs other than "computer-aided instructional material" governed by patent
policy); UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, STATUTE 20: PATENTS AND SOFTWARE 1-2 (approved by Trustees, Apr. 25, 1989) ("device-like software" to be treated like
inventions, "textual software" to be treated like "published material").
It has been suggested that it is the advent of computer programs that has
prompted universities to reevaluate their intellectual property policies. See Hollander, supra note 31, at 222; see also Peterson, supra note 121, at 188 (reporting
that growing computer software sales are forcing universities to rethink copyright policies, stating that "real issue is money"); D'Vera Cohn, Professors Invent
Collegiate Quandary, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1986, at Al (reporting interest in intellectual property policies accelerated by computer programs). Many faculty
members are in fact writing computer programs. Judith Axler Turner, Colleges,
Scholarly Societies, and Foundations Create Software-DisseminationProjects to Share Exper-

tise,

CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct.

17, 1990, at A17.

131. For a discussion of the impact of copyright policies, see supra notes 97116 and accompanying text.
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signed by the professor and the university, into which the copyright policy is expressly incorporated by reference, appears to determine the policy's effectiveness in varying copyright
ownership. 132 It is not clear what proportion of the policies collected are expressly incorporated by reference, although six of
the policies mention such a signed writing.' 3 3 Those universities
which do not have an effective copyright policy, or which have no
policy, do not alter the ownership result produced under the
Copyright Act, as discussed above. 13 4 It is important to bear in
mind that the absence of an effective policy is not necessarily
equivalent to yielding ownership of all works to the faculty.
The copyright policies collected in this study vary in terms of
the types of faculty works claimed for the university. A few policies protect the university's perceived interest by providing for
one of the following in place of sole copyright ownership by the
university: joint copyright ownership by the professor and the
university, a royalty-free license for the university, or reimbursement of the university for use of university resources. Most of the
policies make some effort to protect the professor's interests, in
spite of the fact that the university claims certain works. Examples of this effort are statements of support for academic freedom, provisions for professors to receive a share of royalties, and
provisions giving some limited degree of control over the copyright to the professor. Many policies make some provision for
construction and enforcement of the policies' terms.
It should be noted at the outset that many policies contain
internal inconsistencies, undefined terms, and unnecessarily
vague language. The policies therefore are fertile ground for future litigation, such as Weinstein v. University of Illinois, in which the
copyright policy of the University of Illinois at Chicago was construed. 135 Of the policies studied, some of the best drafted from a
132. For a discussion of the effect of incorporation of copyright policies in
employment contracts, see supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
133. CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY, supra note 130, at 10; UNIVERSITY OF
FLORIDA, FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Rule 6C 1-7.0392, at 44 (Academic Affairs: Copyrights and Patents, no date); UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, COPYRIGHT
POLICY 3 (approved by Regents, June 10, 1982); MASSACHUSETrS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 104, at 20; UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, COPYRIGHT POLICY 7 (Draft, dated Feb. 22, 1990); STANFORD UNIVERSITY, GUIDE MEMO 76:

3 (dated Apr.
15, 1990).
134. For a discussion of the effect of university copyright policies, see supra
notes 97-104 and accompanying text.

COPYRIGHTABLE MATERIALS AND OTHER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

135. For a discussion of Wleinstei,

see supra notes 86-89 and accompanying

text.
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technical standpoint are those of the University of Georgia, Mas136
sachusetts Institute of Technology, and Ohio State University.
The most common standard employed by universities for
claiming ownership of faculty works is "use of university resources" or "significant or substantial use of university resources;" forty-two of the policies in this study employ some
variant of this language. I3 7 That universities should use this standard is not surprising because the use of university resources is
often cited by universities as the equitable basis for their
claims. 138 However, since there is no tradition of applying this
standard, the process of defining it will be one of uncertainty for
both parties, possibly resulting in conflict and litigation. Sixteen
of the forty-two policies narrow the scope of works claimed under
this standard by excluding from "significant use of university resources" some of the following commonly provided resources: libraries, offices, salaries,
classrooms,
laboratories,
and
secretaries.13 9 Two policies provide greater predictability by defining "substantial" or "significant" use in terms of fixed dollar
136. UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, supra note 133; MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 104; OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note 130.
137. E.g., LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note 130, at 9 ("significant
use of funds, space or facilities"); NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY, ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 153 (1989) (Policies and Procedures Governing Intellectual Property, approved by Regents, Oct. 1986) ("significant use
of university facilities"); UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH, supra note 130, at 1 (materials created at least in part with use of university resources); PURDUE UNIVERSITY,
EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM No. B-10 (Statement of University Policy, Principles
and Administrative Procedures Relating to the Ownership of Patents, Copyrights, dated Mar. 21, 1973) ("use of facilities or funds").
138. E.g., CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY, supra note 130, at 7-8 (distribution of financial rewards should reflect resources contributed by and risks as-

sumed by university);

UNIVERSITY

OF WISCONSIN,

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE

POLICY PAPER, SUBJECT: OWNERSHIP, USE AND CONTROL OF INSTRUCTIONAL
MATERIALS 1 (dated Apr. 15, 1977) (university "may have a direct interest in

certain instructional materials because substantial public resources have been
used in their creation and production").
139. E.g., UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, supra note 133, at 2 (excludes libraries);
TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY, supra note 130, ch. 104, at 3 (excludes office and
library; expressly includes classroom and laboratory facilities); UNIVERSITY OF

supra note 100, at 15.5.1.3 (excludes office, library, salary; expressly
includes computer use, graduate assistant's services, laboratory materials and
secretarial assistance). The excluded resources listed in the text appear roughly
in the order of the frequency of their exclusion. Some of the policies clarify that
"significant or substantial use of university resources" means use of resources
beyond those usually available to faculty. E.g., NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, supra note
130, at 124-C ("use of resources commonly available to all faculty" not considered substantial use); UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, supra note 100, at 15.5.1.3 (significant use of university resources is use "over and above that provided in the
normal course of ... support of faculty in the pursuit of scholarly activities").
VIRGINIA,
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antounts. 140 Defining "substantial" with reference to such an ascertainable standard is advisable.
The use of university resources is a broad standard and could

subsume almost any faculty work. This is particularly the case
where "use" is not modified by "substantial" or where secretarial
and word-processing assistance are not excluded. In spite of the
breadth of the university-resource standard, universities are not
currently enforcing such policies to their full extent. 14 1 Aside

from the possibility that the university may be found to have
waived promises by faculty members to assign copyrights by nonenforcement of the policy,

14 2

broad claims that are selectively en-

forced will lead to surprise on the part of professors and
14
increased conflict between professors and the university. 3

140. CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY, supra note 130, at 3 (use qualifies if
"use of similar facilities would cost the creator more than $5,000... in constant
1984 dollars if purchased or leased in the public market"); VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY, POLICY ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 8 (no
date) (use of non-excluded resources in excess of $1,000 in any 12-month period is substantial); see also NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note 130,
at 2 (significant use of resources includes use of consultants or research/teaching assistants for more than eight hours in one semester).
A standard similar in rationale to "substantial use of university resources,"
which appears in nine of the policies in this study, is "direct allocation for a
specific project." E.g., CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 130,
ch. 7, at 6 ("if... the Institute provides its own funds.., to finance.., a specific
research or educational project"); UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 22 (Copyright Policy, adopted Dec., 1986)
("direct allocation of University funds for the pursuit of a specific project");
STANFORD UNIVERSITY,

supra note 133, at 1 ("direct allocation of funds through

the University for a specific project"). This standard should prove relatively
straightforward to construe and apply.
141. See, e.g., Letter from Elizabeth B. O'Brien, Assistant General Counsel,
University of Pennsylvania (June 12, 1990); Janis Clark, Formulation of a Guide
to University Copyright Policy Revision 80-81 (1984) (unpublished doctoral dissertation in education, University of Northern Colorado) (consisting of survey of
opinions of university administrators and faculty at 36 universities and suggesting that fact that faculty is generally unaware of policies is evidence of
nonenforcement).
142. See, e.g., Saverslak v. Davis-Cleaver Produce Co., 606 F.2d 208, 213
(7th Cir. 1979) (stating waiver occurs when known right is intentionally relinquished, either expressly or by conduct inconsistent with intent to enforce
right), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); see generally 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 678 (3d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1991).
143. None of the policies in this study appears to be so broad as to be invalid under state statutes invalidating contracts by employees to assign to employers their "inventions" produced without the employer's resources, on the
employee's own time, unrelated to the employer's business and research, and
not resulting from the employee's work for the employer. See CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 2870 (West 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 805 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
140, para. 302 (Smith-Hurd 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-130 (1986); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 181.78 (West Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-57.1 (1985); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 34-39-3 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.140 (West 1990).
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With the exception of policies which claim works by genre,
the remaining standards for determining which works are claimed
by the university all derive from the concept of work made for
hire. These policies claim works produced as a result of "specific," "direct" or "written" "job assignment" or "duties"
(twenty-five policies), 144 works produced by "persons hired to
produce such works" (nine policies), 14 5 "commissioned" works
(ten policies),1 46 or works made for hire within the meaning of the
Copyright Act (six policies). 14 7 The use of the language "works
produced by persons hired to produce such works" is not recommended; such language might or might not include, for example,
traditional scholarship. Given the confusion in the courts concerning the survival of the exception for professors from the
work-made-for-hire doctrine, it is not advisable to draft a copyright policy in terms of works made for hire within the meaning of
the Copyright Act.
Some policies claim and disclaim works by genre. The type
of work most often claimed by genre is computer programs;
nineteen copyright policies in this study specifically claim some or
all computer programs created by faculty. 148 A few policies atThe above statutes do not define the term "invention," with the result that the
statutes may be applicable to some copyrightable works, particularly computer
programs. See Ronald Cooley, Recent Changes in Employee Ownership Laws: Employers May Not Own Their Inventions and Confidential Information, 41 Bus. LAW. 57, 66
(1985); Henrik D. Parker, Note, Reform for Rights of Employed Inventors, 57 S. CAL.
L. REV. 603, 614 (1984). To comply with the above statutes, other than those of
North Carolina, Delaware and Utah, the university must include notice of the
limits imposed by the statute in any contract requiring assignment of
"inventions."
144. E.g., UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, supra note 127, at 2 ("specific assignments or specific duties not connected with conventional teaching, research,
scholarship or artistic endeavors"); OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note 130, at 1
("specific University duty or assignment"); PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, supra note
130, at 2 ("specifically assigned duties").
145. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII, HAWAII ADMINISTRATIVE RULES tit. 20,

ch. 3 (Patent and Copyright Policy, effective Nov. 22, 1968) ("produced by persons who are engaged by the university specifically to produce such manuscripts
or works"); UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, supra note 127, at 3 (works of faculty employed "for the purpose of producing such works"); PURDUE UNIVERSITY, supra
note 137, at 2 (work produced by person "employed by the University for the
specific purpose of preparing materials").
146. E.g., MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note 127, at 151; UNIVERSITY
OF MISSOURI, COLLECTED RULES AND REGULATIONS 100.030, at 1 (1986) (Copyright Regulations, no date); STANFORD UNIVERSITY, supra note 133, at 1.
147. E.g., UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI, supra note 140, at 21; UNIVERSITY OF
ROCHESTER, supra note 130, at 3; TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY, supra note 130, ch.

104, at 1-2.
148. For a further discussion of policies claiming computer programs, see
supra note 130 and accompanying text. A few of the claims to computer pro-
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tempt to define claimed works in terms of genres or types of work
other than computer programs, 4 9 such as "technical materials"
developed "under the jurisdiction of the university," including
photographs, audiotapes, films, and broadcasting scripts,' 50 or
"material in non-print media."' 151 Thus, works claimed by genre
tend to be potentially marketable works, whose production may
require expensive equipment.
Eighteen policies in this study limit the impact of the policies
on faculty by claiming for the university an interest less than sole
copyright ownership with respect to at least some works. Those
few policies which provide for the university and the professor to
be "joint owners" or "co-authors" of certain works' 52 are presumably intended to create, and in fact do create, tenancies in
common rather than joint tenancies, by analogy to section 201 (a)
of the Copyright Act, which creates a tenancy in common in coowners of a joint work. 153 Such provisions creating cotenancies
between the university and the professor are inadvisable. Since
either co-owner can license the work, 154 joint decisions by the
grams are extremely broad. For example, the California Institute of Technology
policy claims "all rights to computer software ... whether copyrightable or patentable produced by Faculty members in the line of Institute duty or with the
use of Institute facilities." CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note
130, ch. 7, at 6.
149. Two policies apply only to "educational materials." MICHIGAN STATE
UNIVERSITY, supra note 127, at 150; UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, supra note 146, at
1. The University of Missouri policy, however, defines the above term so
broadly that it might include any copyrightable work. UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI,
supra note 146, at 1-3. For a discussion of works disclaimed by genre, see infra
note 163 and accompanying text.

150.

COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY,

supra note 130, at J-3. The policy does

not define "technical materials" or "jurisdiction of the University," but gives
examples, including those cited in the text.

151.

ROCKEFELLER UNIVERSITY,

supra note 130, at 1. Materials in non-print

media are claimed only if produced "in the course of employment by the University" or "through the use of facilities or funds of the University." Id.
152. UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, supra note 133, at 2; GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 127, at 6:16; UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT
CHAPEL HILL, UNIVERSITY COPYRIGHT GUIDELINES 7 (approved by Faculty
cil, no date); NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note 130, at 1.

Coun-

153. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988). Section 101 provides that a " 'joint
work' is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole." Id. § 101. "The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in
the work." Id. § 201 (a). The form of cotenancy between co-owners of copyright
is tenancy in common. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 19, § 6.09.
Such a policy provision does not create a "joint work" within the meaning
of the Copyright Act because the policy cannot make the university an "author"
within the meaning of the act. For a discussion of the effect of employer-employee agreements, see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
154. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 19, § 6.10.
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university and the professor will be necessary for effective marketing of the work. 155 A more workable alternative, employed with
respect to at least some works by ten policies in this study, is to
give the university a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use the
work. 156 Such a provision permits the professor to market the
work independently outside the university because the university
has no right to license use of the work to others.' 5 7 An alternative
which creates even less possibility of future friction between the
professor and university is reimbursement of the university by the
professor for the resources used. Reimbursement provisions appear in five policies with respect to certain works.' 58 However,
neither a license to use the work within the university nor reimbursement satisfies the university's interest in generating
revenue.
University copyright policies generally show concern for the
interests of faculty. Attempts to protect these interests range
from purely symbolic assertions of commitment to academic freedom' 59 to royalty provisions and express disclaimers by the university of copyright in certain works. Eighteen of the policies in
155. For a discussion of the advisability of co-ownership between elementary and secondary schools and their teachers, see VerSteeg, supra note 87, at
410.

156. See, e.g.,

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY COPYRIGHT POLICY 4

(dated Aug. 1, 1975; revised Apr. 15, 1977) ("free and irrevocable license" to
use works created without university resources "in conjunction with... Univer-

sity employment");

CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY,

supra note 130, at 33

("royalty-free right to... internal use" of material developed "as a consequence

of initiatives taken by others" than the professor);

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON,

supra note 100, at 49 ("right to royalty-free use" of material when development
was "advanced" through use of university resources). Note that such licenses
are analogous to the rights conferred on the employer by the "shop right" doc-

trine of patent law. See 1

PETER

D.

ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS

§ 11.04, at 11-16 (1988). Not included in the tally is one policy which claims an
exclusive license in works to which the university's contribution is "de minimis."
VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note 140, at 6.
A non-exclusive, royalty-free license held by schools in the works of teachers is the solution recommended in the context of elementary and secondary
schools by Professor VerSteeg. VerSteeg, supra note 87, at 410-12.
157. Such policy provisions do not always state explicitly that the license
does not include the power to grant further licenses.
158. E.g., HARVARD UNIVERSITY, supra note 127, at 4 (where "significant ad-

ditional costs" to university, reimbursement expected);

UNIVERSITY OF NEW

supra note 100, at 7 (where employee makes extensive use of university
resources, director, department chair or dean may require reimbursement);
MEXICO,

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY,

supra note 130, at 2 (where "substantial expenditures for

additional work .... part of the income received should be used to reimburse").
159. For a statement of traditional academic freedom, see American Association of University Professors and Association of American Colleges (Joint Conference), 1940
Statement of Principles in Academic Freedom and Tenure.
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this study contain statements of commitment to academic freedom or the free dissemination of ideas. 6 0° Such concerns are
raised by university ownership of faculty works because the copyright owner has exclusive power to publish' 6' and may suppress
publication. 62 Sixteen policies expressly disclaim university
ownership of copyrights in traditional scholarly works, such as
books and articles, although most of these policies contain exceptions to this disclaimer.' 63 Nearly every policy (forty-six) provides
for payment of a share of the income from at least some works
16 4
claimed by the university to the creator of the work.
The most creative measures designed to protect the professor's interests are those which recognize the importance to the
professor of control over dissemination of works whose copyright
is claimed by the university. Most of the universities in this study
have not employed such measures. Relatively few policies contain, for example, provisions which grant the professor the power
65
to control use of the work within the university (five policies),'
160. E.g., LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note 130, at 9 ("The copy-

right policy seeks to protect and promote the traditional academic freedom of
the University's faculty, staff, and students in matters of publication."); STANFORD UNIVERSITY, supra note 133, at 1 ("[t]o enable the University to foster the
free and creative expression and exchange of ideas and comment"); YALE UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY COPYRIGHT POLICY 1 (adopted by Corporation, June, 1990)
("[T]he University encourages the wide dissemination of scholarly work produced by members of the Yale community, including copyrightable works.").
161. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1988) (owner of copyright has exclusive right to
distribute copies or phonorecords of copyrighted work to public by sale, rental
or lending).
162. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 423 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (the owner's "copyright permits him to suppress its publication"), rev'd on
other grounds, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
163. E.g., UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, supra note 130, at 3 ("the University
generally does not claim for itself copyrights in those books, articles, theses,
papers, novels . . . and similar works which are intended to disseminate the results of the academic research, scholarship, and artistic expression of its
faculty"; excepted are works produced with significant use of university resources, "institutional works" and sponsored works); UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE,
supra note 127, at 3 (rights to textbooks and monographs and scholarly and literary publications belong to creator unless work is commissioned or sponsored).
164. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 130, ch. 7,
at 1 ("the author ... will receive fifteen percent (15%) of the gross sum of any
royalty received by the Institute"); NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note
137, at 153 ("[F]or earnings less than or equal to $1,000,000, the originator will
receive not less than 50 percent and the university the remainder. For those
earnings in excess of $1,000,000, the originator will receive not less than 25
percent, and the university the remainder."); UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, supra note
100, at 15.5.1.4 ("[T]he work's author(s) will receive, from any work in which it
is determined that the University owns the copyright interest, fifty percent of the
net royalties or other income which accrue.").
165. CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY, supra note 130, at 29; MICHIGAN
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the power to revise the work (seven policies),

16 6

263

or the power to

make new works based on the claimed work (one policy). 16 7 None
of the policies in this study gives the professor unilateral control

over any aspect of use of the work outside the university, such as
how or where the work is marketed or published. 168 Only six policies provide for transfer of the copyright in works claimed by the
university to the professor if commercialization or publication has
not taken place within a given time period, and most such provi16 9
sions are not mandatory.
STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note 127, at 152; UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, supra note
146, at 5; PURDUE UNIVERSITY, supra note 137, at 3; UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON,

supra note 100, at 50-51.
All but one of the above policies also provide that the university and the
professor shall make an agreement concerning the conditions of use outside the
university. E.g., PURDUE UNIVERSITY, supra note 137, at 3 (licensing or sale by
university shall be preceded by written agreement between university and author regarding conditions of use).
166. CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY, supra note 130, at 29; MICHIGAN
STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note 127, at 153; PURDUE UNIVERSITY, supra note 137, at
3; TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY, supra note 130, ch. 104, at 2; UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, supra note 146, at 5; UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, supra note 127, at 7; UNIVERSITY
OF WISCONSIN, supra note 138, at 3.
167. UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, supra note 146, at 3. The right to make a
new work based upon an existing work is the copyright owner's exclusive right
to make a derivative work. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(2) (1988).
Fourteen policies require the university to consult with the professor concerning use or revision of the work; such a provision gives the professor no control over his work. See, e.g., VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE
UNIVERSITY, supra note 140, at 8 (author shall have the right to make recommendations to the president regarding marketing).
168. A few policies provide that the university may, at its discretion, grant
the author control over certain aspects of distribution. E.g., MASSACHUSETrS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 104, at 13.
169. E.g., CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY, supra note 130, at 8 (if university
does not develop commercially, ownership "may be acquired by the creator");
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, supra note 127, at 6 (if no commercialization within
two years, originator may request that all rights be returned); VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note 140, at 5 (if university fails
to make progress toward exploitation within 12 months, employee may make
written request that ownership pass to employee).
The provisions dealing with revisions, derivative works, and transfer of
copyright to the author if there is not timely commercialization, as well as author's warranties (seven policies), may have been suggested by publishing contracts, which often contain such provisions. The author's warranties consist of
promises that works claimed by the university do not infringe any copyrights or
violate any other rights, and of promises to indemnify the university for any loss
if the works do so infringe or violate rights. See, e.g., MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note 127, at 156 (faculty member shall certify that materials do not
infringe any copyright or other rights and shall be liable to university for judgments resulting from such infringements); TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY, supra note
130, ch. 104, at 7 (author shall warrant that work does not infringe any copyright
or other rights and that work contains no libelous material or material that invades privacy).
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Construction of the policies will become necessary as disputes arise; the issues of construction and adjudication of disputes are addressed by some of the policies. Of these policies,
many provide for a committee within the university to perform
the initial decision making, with a final "binding" decision to be
made either through "arbitration" or by a university official, such
as the provost or president. 70 To the extent that the policy is
enforceable as a contract,' 7' such provisions would constitute an
agreement to arbitrate, which is generally enforceable.' 72 The
fact that university officials are also representatives of the university does not appear to disqualify them from acting as the sole
arbitrators of disputes.' 73 However, use of university officials as
final arbiters of ownership disputes between the university and
faculty may create the appearance of unfairness and therefore
lead to increased conflict.
VII.

OWNERSHIP OF PROFESSORS' WORKS

The previous sections of this Article have addressed the
questions of who owns the copyright in professors' works under
the Copyright Act and under the terms of university copyright
policies. This section suggests approaches to the question of who
should own faculty works.
Asking who should own the copyright in faculty works suggests an overly simplistic response. The interest taken by universities in faculty copyrights is primarily monetary, as demonstrated
170. E.g., CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY, supra note 130, at 9 (party not satisfied with decision of committee may seek binding arbitration); UNIVERSITY OF
MIAMI, supra note 130, at 123 (appeal from committee to president whose decision is binding).
171. The enforceability of an arbitration provision would be an issue only
where the ownership provisions of the policy were enforceable. For a discussion
of the enforceability of ownership provisions, see supra notes 97-116 and accompanying text.
172. Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 742 F. Supp. 1359,
1365 (N.D. Il1. 1990) (question whether issue is arbitrable is to be resolved in
favor of arbitration); Frager v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 231 A.2d 531, 533
(Conn. 1967) ("duty to arbitrate may be created by contract"), appeal after remand, 289 A.2d 896 (Conn. 1971).
173. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth., 735 F.
Supp. 1205, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (parties free to agree upon identity of arbitrators); City of Baltimore v. Allied Contractors, Inc., 204 A.2d 546, 552 (Md.
1964) (parties may provide for submission of disputes to arbitrator who is an
official of one of the parties). But see Hope v. Superior Court of Santa Clara
County, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851, 856 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding arbitration provisions
unconscionable where arbitrators were associated with employer), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 910 (1982).
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by the universities' interest in holding copyright in technologically complex works, evident in the university policies discussed
above. 174 Some university officials assert that the university's motive in claiming professors' works is not solely revenue raising,
but that the university thereby assists the professor in distribution. 175 However, assistance in exploitation through publication
and licensing can be offered to professors without claiming any
interest in faculty works. Further, the model of narrow-minded
professors, who lack the wider vision of university administrators
necessary in order to protect the interests of society in their copyrightable works, does not reflect reality. Faculty members have,
on the other hand, in addition to monetary interests in their
works, an interest in controlling their dissemination, such as the
manner of distribution, the making of revisions, and the production of later works based on their works. 176 The latter interests
have received too little recognition from universities that establish the rights of the parties by contract, as demonstrated by the
analysis of university policies in the preceding section. The university has little to gain by claiming aspects of the copyright in
which it has no real interest; to the extent possible the economic
77
and academic interests in faculty works should be separated.
Aspects of the copyright that should be considered in any determination of who should own which rights include: (1) the right to
determine whether to distribute, when to distribute, through what
marketing organization, at what price, with what revisions ini174. For a discussion of university interest in faculty copyrights, see supra
notes 128-30 and 148-51 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 130, at Al.
176. The monetary rights and other rights comprising the copyright discussed in the text are narrower than the "pecuniary" and "nonpecuniary interests . . . at stake in the creative process," discussed by Professor Dreyfuss. See
Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 605. For example, one of the nonpecuniary interests
discussed by Professor Dreyfuss is the choice of what works to create and when
to create them. Id. at 606-14. Professor Dreyfuss argues that copyright ownership in the university is undesirable in part because the university would then
have the incentive to influence these decisions. Id. Universities presently exert
enormous influence over these decisions regardless of copyright ownership.
See id. at 617, 620, 625 (discussing impact on creative employee's reputation
of timing of publication and of form in which work published; harm to creator if
unable to make derivative works); Clark, supra note 141, at 79 (reporting that
survey shows faculty fear university control of their works).
177. Professor Dreyfuss warns of a problem that may arise if the creator
owns the right to decide when to publish, but not the right to income: the creator may delay publication. Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 618. This problem will not
arise if the creator has some share of the right to income, which is the case under
most of the copyright policies in this study. For examples of universities sharing
income with faculty, see supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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tially, and when to make further revisions (such as a second edition); (2) the right to make such further revisions; (3) the right to
make and license the making of other works based on the work;
(4) the right to perform the work; (5) the right to receive income
produced by the work in its original form, to receive income produced by the work with subsequent revisions, and to receive income produced by works based on the work; and (6) the right to
acquire distribution rights if the other party fails to distribute.
Of course, the academic and economic interests in copyrightable works may, in some cases, be inextricable, as where the professor wishes to distribute his work free of charge in the interest
of scholarship, and the university wishes to exploit the work financially.17 8 Among copyrightable works this particular conflict is especially likely to arise with respect to computer programs written
79
by faculty. 1
The issues that bear on the determination of who should own
even the monetary interest in a work are complex. Colleges and
universities face a pressing need for sources of revenue as enrollments decline' 80 and government spending for higher education
decreases.1 81 Advances in technology impose new costs on universities for expensive equipment and specialized personnel. i82
178. See, e.g., Lisa Gerrard, When a University Faculty Member Develops Academic
Software, Who Should Share in the Profits?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 22, 1987, at
A64 (noting conflict between academic tradition to share work freely and profit
motive).
179. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 130, at A17 (most professors "happy to
share their [higher-education software] with their colleagues"). An example is
the case of a professor who left the California Institute of Technology in 1983
when the university, claiming it owned the copyright in a computer program he
had developed, tried to prevent him from distributing it cheaply to others in his
field. Gina Kolata, Caltech Torn by Dispute Over Software, 220 Sci. 932-33 (1983);
The Tempest Raging Over Profit-Minded Professors, Bus. WK., Nov. 7, 1983, at 86.
180. For a discussion of the level of concern over declining enrollments,
see infra note 182.
181. See, e.g., Karen Grassmuck, Colleges Scramble for Money to Reduce Huge
Maintenance Backlog, Estimated to Exceed $70-Billion; New Federal Help Seen Unlikely,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 10, 1990, at A1; Scott Jaschik, States Spending $40.8Billion on Colleges This Year; Growth Rate at a 30-Year Low, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Oct. 24, 1990, at Al.
182. See, e.g., Constance Holden, Payingfor Research Instrumentation, 229 Scm.
1247, 1247 (1985) (reporting that funds are insufficient to meet rising cost of
university research equipment); Colleges Pleasedthat Growth of Computer Science Majors is Slowing, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 8, 1986, at 28 (investment in computer technology overwhelms many institutions). In response to a survey
conducted by the American Council on Education in 1989, the most frequently
cited problems facing colleges and universities during the next five years were
adequate finances (39%), maintaining enrollment (44%), and facilities and technology (42%). See Leading Research Universities, supra note 122, at 24.
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Individuals generally cannot amass the resources necessary for
the production of technologically complex works. Therefore, if
such works are to be produced, larger institutions, including universities, must be given the means to do so.' 8 3 On the other
hand, those professors with skills marketable outside the university may, as has already occurred in the fields of business, engineering and computer science, 8 4 leave the university for more
lucrative positions in industry. Depriving such professors of supplemental income they might derive from their copyrightable
works may contribute to this flight from the university. The issues to be balanced are complex and circumstances vary from
university to university and among fields of work. Thus, ownership issues should be resolved, as the major research universities
have begun to resolve them,' 85 by contract, rather than by one
monolithic rule of law.
How should such contracts, in the form of university copyright policies, look? Suggestions as to drafting techniques have
been made in Part VI above. With respect to the substance of
such policies, it is impossible to lay out a model plan which will be
appropriate to every university and to every type of work. Upon
consideration of the concerns discussed above, universities with
sufficient endowments may find it expedient to allocate all copyrights to faculty creators, while other universities may decide to
fund the production of expensive, technologically complex works
with a share in the revenue produced by such works. Still other
183. Ownership of copyright has traditionally been considered an incentive
to investment and creation. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (explaining that copyright monopoly "is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors"). Copyright revenues can
also provide funds for further investment and, consequently, the means for further creation. Professor Reichman advocates university commercialization of
faculty computer programs as a means of obtaining funding. Reichman, supra
note 1, at 712-13, 722.
184. Scott Heller, Faculty-Salary Systems Are Strainedas Colleges Try to Hire and
Retain Professors in Competitive Fields, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 26, 1986, at 1;
Robert L. Jacobson, Low Pay and Declining Working Conditions Seen Threatening Col-

leges' Teacher Supply,

CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,

Mar. 27, 1985, at 21 (reporting that

leaving university for industry is trend in business, engineering, computer science); see also HOWARD R. BOWEN & JACK H. SCHUSTER, AMERICAN PROFESSORS:
A NATIONAL RESOURCE IMPERILED 170 (1986) (finding relative attractiveness of
business, government and other fields of employment lures faculty away from
academia); Debra E. Blum,job Market Begins Predicted Turnaround Survey Indicates,
Many Colleges Find It Difficult to Fill Faculty Vacancies, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July
25, 1990, at Al (reporting difficulty in filling faculty positions in engineering,
accounting).
185. For a discussion of universities' adoption of copyright policies, see

supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
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universities may find it advisable to allocate to themselves some
interest in additional types of works based on either expense of
production or profitability or both. What is essential is that the
university allocate to itself only those aspects of the copyright in
which it truly has an interest.
As discussed in Part IV, to the extent that the judge-made
exception for professors from work-made-for-hire provisions ever
existed, it continues to exist.' 8 6 The question whether such an
exception should exist is really the question whether, in the absence of any contract dealing with copyright ownership (which
8 7 it
still appears to be the case at most colleges and universities),
is preferable for all faculty works to belong to the university or to
the professor. Since faculty members have traditionally assumed
and generally still assume that they own the copyright in their
works, the parties' expectations are protected by preserving the
exception to the work-made-for-hire provisions of the Copyright
Act.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The picture frequently presented of work-made-for-hire
cases under the 1909 Act is misleading. The treatment of section
26 as creating a presumption rather than an absolute rule of copyright ownership in the employer played a smaller role in cases
decided under the 1909 Act than prior commentators indicate.
Further, there was no uniformity as to the form of evidence admissible in order to prove the existence of an agreement that the
employee own the copyright. In particular, very few cases stated
that evidence of custom in the industry could be used for this
purpose.
In spite of a widely held, though unpopular, view that the
Copyright Act of 1976 abolished the exception for professors
from work-made-for-hire provisions, originating in two influential
articles published in 1983 and 1985, the 1976 Act did not disturb
the exception. To the extent that the exception ever existed, it
continues to exist. However, a university copyright policy, if expressly incorporated by reference into a written employment contract, signed by both the professor and the university, appears to
186. For an explanation of the widespread, mistaken belief that the 1976
Act abolished the professors' exception to the work-made-for-hire provisions,
see supra notes 51-94 and accompanying text.
187. For a discussion of the fact that most colleges and universities have
not adopted copyright ownership policies, see supra note 121 and accompanying
text.
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269

satisfy the requirements of sections 204(a) and 201(b), thereby
effectively varying ownership results produced by the Copyright
Act. The university copyright policies, if any, of seventy leading
research universities, collected for this study, vary in terms of the
works claimed for the university. Most of the copyright policies in
this study make some effort to protect the interests of professors.
Of these efforts, those few policies that subdivide the copyright in
works claimed by the university in order to protect the professors'
interest in controlling dissemination are most notable.
The exception for professors from the work-made-for-hire
provisions should be preserved in order to protect the parties'
expectations, ownership issues should be resolved by means of
copyright policies, and the economic and academic interests in
faculty works claimed by universities should be separated in order
to protect the interests of professors.
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A

Boston University
California Institute of Technology
Carnegie-Mellon University
Case Western Reserve University
Colorado State University
Columbia University
Cornell University
Duke University
Georgia Institute of Technology
Harvard University
Howard University
Indiana University at Bloomington
Johns Hopkins University
Louisiana State University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Michigan State University
New Mexico State University
New York University
North Carolina State University
Northwestern University
Ohio State University
Oregon State University
Pennsylvania State University
Princeton University
Purdue University
Rockefeller University
Rutgers University
Stanford University
State University of New York at Stony Brook
Texas A & M University
University of Arizona
University of California at Berkeley
University of California at Davis
University of California at Irvine
University of California at Los Angeles
University of California at San Diego
University of California at San Francisco
University of Chicago
University of Cincinnati
University of Colorado at Boulder
University of Connecticut
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University of Florida

University of Georgia
University of Hawaii at Manoa
University of Illinois at Chicago
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
University of Iowa
University of Kentucky
University of Maryland at College Park
University of Miami
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities
University of Missouri at Columbia
University of New Mexico
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
University of Pennsylvania
University of Pittsburgh
University of Rochester
University of Southern California
University of Tennessee at Knoxville
University of Texas at Austin
University of Utah
University of Virginia
University of Washington
University of Wisconsin at Madison
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Vanderbilt University
Washington University
Yale University
Yeshiva University
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